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The Organization of African Unity marked its 50th anniversary in 2013 and, despite the shift to the 
African Union and continued rhetoric from African leaders about the need for further integration, 
the progress towards the goal of economic and political integration has been ineffective. This thesis 
shows that integration has been ineffective in Africa namely because of the lack of political will to 
push integration further. The reason for this is the prevalence of neopatrimonialism on the 
continent, which creates a situation where leaders need access to a nation’s resources to remain in 
power. Economic and political integration will, inevitably, result in a loss of financial or political 
capital, which will then result in a lack of resources available for the client, who has used these 
resources to maintain their patronage base. 
Thus, integration in Africa has progressed slowly, as leaders do what they can to undermine the 
process while maintaining the appearance of progress. The major option chosen to weaken 
integration has been to control the institutions of integration run intergovernmentally, rather than 
transfer some power towards a supranational organisation. Without a transfer of power to a 
supranational institution, the Regional Economic Communities and African states cannot proceed 
towards economic, let alone political, integration. The reason for this is that decisions taken in a 
purely intergovernmental body, such as the African Union, will be of the lowest common 
denominator, resulting in a slow and ineffective integration. For integration to progress effectively, 
some powers will first have to be transferred to a supranational institution, which will create more 
actors that are actively involved in the integration process and make it more difficult for leaders to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The idea of integration is not new in Africa. During colonialism, there were calls for unity by Pan 
Africanists dating back to 1900. With independence came great hope and great rhetoric about this 
drive, but a realpolitik longing for territorial integrity and sovereignty after colonisation prevented 
this from becoming a reality. However, this did not stop the political rhetoric towards the dream of 
integration and steps toward integration, both economic and political, rose while African economies 
and states faltered. The ‘grand plan’ of a United States of Africa was replaced by gradual steps via 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was replaced by the African Union (AU), which now 
uses Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to further integration. The steps towards integration 
have started, stopped and then started again for over five decades – all in the quest for greater 
integration in Africa and improved development and standards for its peoples. Despite further 
rhetoric about the need for increased integration, the attempts have, for the most part, fallen short 
and have not been effective in facilitating African development nor increasing African integration. 
This thesis argues that the major issue standing in the way of effective integration is a lack of 
political will on the part of African leaders. This lack of political will results from a leader’s reluctance 
to share or transfer their power with another institution, especially one with supranational powers, 
as doing so would compromise their position of power in a neopatrimonial political arena. However, 
refusing to do so will mean that integration in Africa can only proceed so far and the continent will 
not be able to achieve the goals set for integration, such as a continental free trade area or any form 
of political union. This is unfortunate, as the reasons to integrate outnumber the reasons not to 
integrate, as noted by many scholars and institutions. The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UN ECA) noted in 1963 that while “the reduction or elimination of barriers to intra-African 
trade [is] in itself not sufficient, [it] remains a necessary pre-condition for the accelerated economic 
development of African countries” (Hazlewood, 1967: 4). This feeling has not changed half a century 
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later, which is evident by the recurrent calls for greater cooperation and integration by the UN ECA’s 
Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA) reports and the African Development Bank, which 
emphasises that “successful regional trade integration can help African countries reap economies of 
scale, expand markets and collectively exploit their resources, thus gradually raising their 
competitiveness in the global economy” (Ancharaz et al, 2011: 1). Politically, greater integration 
could result in increased bargaining power for African states, as well as help to improve governance 
in the continent. Despite these positives, integration in Africa has achieved few of the goals set by 
the myriad treaties signed by leaders and, hence, can be labelled as ineffective.  
 In his analysis of the obstacles to regional integration, Kaplan blamed poor integration on “rivalries 
between states, reluctance to compromise national sovereignty, internal instability within key 
states, resistance from officials who profit from disparate national policies, and a general lack of 
capacity and political will to move forward” (Kaplan, 2006: 87). All of these problems are centred on 
the political leaders – economic and international factors are important, but ultimately the decision 
to move integration forward or not rests, initially, with Africa’s leaders. Thus far, the form of 
integration in Africa chosen by these leaders has been intergovernmental, where Heads of State 
control the decisions of the institutions, as opposed to supranational, where some power is given to 
an institution above the member states. This intergovernmental decision-making results in little 
action, if any at all, in solving the problems of the continent as the consensus bargaining inherent in 
intergovernmentalism results in the lowest common denominator decisions. For this to change, 
leaders would have to give up some sovereignty to a supranational institution, which they are loathe 
to do. As Nzewi notes, “the reluctance of African leaders to delegate sovereignty in any form is 
driven chiefly by the need to protect state control at the national level” (Nzewi, 2009: 6), as African 
leaders need this control at the state level for them to remain in power – a situation compounded by 
the prevalence of neopatrimonialism in the national power structures. A loss of power to the 
supranational level would come at the expense of their power at the national level, and, eventually, 
a loss of the resources needed to stay in power in a neopatrimonial political system.  
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If Africa cannot break free of its intergovernmental system, can the continent expect to integrate 
effectively? This thesis will answer that no, the continent will not reach its goals of economic and 
political union without some sort of devolution of power towards a higher level. The most successful 
integration process to date, the European Union (EU), was able to continue integrating, even during 
times of intergovernmentalism, because of the initial supranational institution that was established: 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This resulted in spillover, akin to Ernst B. Haas’ idea 
with neofunctionalism, not because of interests among business leaders and the supranational 
institution, but because as one transnational barrier is lowered (such as free trade of coal), there are 
more obstacles that need to be overcome for that barrier to be lowered properly (such as transport 
regulations), which will mean more areas will need to become supranational. This thesis does not 
compare the EU to the AU, but it does analyse the paths chosen by each intergovernmental 
organisation to illustrate how supranational power is needed for integration to continue effectively. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
While the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) strove to protect newly-independent states’ territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, it still alluded to the Pan Africanist dream of thinkers such as WEB Dubois 
and state leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah. The last two sentences of the Preamble to the OAU 
Charter states that it is "desirous that all African states should henceforth unite so that the welfare 
and wellbeing of their peoples can be assured (and) resolved to reinforce the links between our 
states by establishing and strengthening common institutions"(OAU, 1963: 1). Attempts at further 
integration, especially economic, continued with little success during the Cold War period (Mistry, 
2000: 553), but there was a shift towards a ‘new’ regionalism in the 1990s, due to the end of the 
Cold War and the apparent success of the burgeoning EU model. This led to renewed hope and a 
spate of treaties and conventions, including the Abuja Treaty, which established plans for an African 
Economic Community (AEC), regional economic communities (RECs) as well as planned 
supranational institutions like the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), and the Sirte Declaration, which 
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called for a speeding-up of the timeline of integration and transformed the OAU into the AU. The AU 
and leaders of African states have, on numerous occasions, called for a “United States of Africa” and 
political integration to be the end goal of the African Union. More recently, the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa has stated that, in regards to the process of integration, “the experts in Addis 
are in an upbeat mood and have a renewed enthusiasm for shortening the period of the vision of the 
Abuja Treaty” (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2011). Despite this, integration in 
Africa has been slow and ineffective.  
The study of this subject is important for several reasons. First, academic research in this area is 
scant and most research conducted is of economic outlooks for the RECs and proposed custom 
unions or free trade areas, but which pay little attention to the political side of integration, except 
for mentioning a lack of political will when outlining the obstacles to integration. This thesis will 
analyse the political factors preventing integration in Africa. Secondly, an Africa that is united either 
in regions or as an entire continent could help tackle the problems of development and growth 
which it experiences as divided states. A harmonization of policy and opening of borders could help 
to improve intra-African trade, as well as infrastructure and regulations needed to increase trade 
outside of Africa.  
1.3 Research Aims and Questions 
The first research aim is to analyse the reasons for the slow progress of African integration.  
The second research aim will be to prove that integration cannot proceed very far in a purely 
intergovernmental fashion. Some sovereignty will have to be shared with a supranational institution 
for integration to be effective. 
The research questions are: 
What has caused the slow progress of African integration? 
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Can African integration progress meaningfully if leaders refuse to give power to a 
supranational institution? 
The hypothesis for the slow process of integration in Africa is the lack of will on the part of political 
leaders to cede any sovereignty, and hence weaken their political authority, to a supranational 
institution. A good illustration of this refusal is the PAP, which was supposed to become a fully-
functioning legislative body by 2009 and was one of the areas in which the UNECA has been 
‘upbeat’, though as of yet is still only an advisory body and no action has been taken to convert it 
into the supranational, legislative body as it was originally designed to be. Nzewi states that, in 
regards to the PAP not becoming fully legislative, “article 2(3) effectively restrains the PAP from 
acquiring greater legislative, budgetary and supervisory powers, thereby removing any immediate 
threat to the principle of state autonomy that many African Heads of State clearly continue to value 
above the principle of continental political integration” (Nzewi, 2009: 4).  
This refusal to cede sovereignty or weaken political authority will mean that integration cannot 
refuse meaningfully, as decision-making will be made in a purely intergovernmental manner which 
results in lowest common denominator decisions. A supranational institution and transfer of power 
towards it will be needed for integration to continue effectively. 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical study of integration is relatively new, as there were few good examples of regional 
integration before the evolving of the EU in the mid-20th century. That said, the idea of states 
integrating for peace is not new, as demonstrated by Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” from 1795 and the 
works of Saint-Simon in the 19th century, among others. This thesis will focus on two theories to help 
explain integration (and the lack thereof) in Africa: neofunctionalism and (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism. While it is impossible to state that one theory is ‘correct’ and the other 
‘incorrect’ (Moga, 2009:802), these approaches give a good insight into how decisions about 




The predecessor to neofunctionalism was Mitrany’s idea of functionalism, which was less of a theory 
and more of a normative concept, as, according to Mitrany, “the problem of our time is not how to 
keep nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together” (Mitrany, 1966: 28). Peace 
could be achieved by states pooling sovereignty in a low politic area to an entrusted. Mitrany first 
wrote of the idea of spillover, though did not go too far into explaining how this spillover would 
occur. These functional organizations would be able to decrease nationalism and increase 
interdependence, which were two areas that Mitrany saw as responsible for the major wars in 
Europe. This idea, while noble, still has many flaws – a major one being that if states’ motive for 
integration was peace, why did so many European states stay out of the ECSC and the European 
Economic Community?  
Ernst B. Haas attempted to overcome these faults and develop a proper theory of integration using 
the ideas of functionalism and spillover. His theory of neofunctionalism is more concerned with the 
pressures for integration once it has begun, rather than why it was launched (Biswaro, 2012: 20). 
Haas discounted the role the state will actually play in integration and instead saw two primary 
actors in integration: interest groups and political parties below the state and supranational 
institutions above the nation-state. These two actors work together to pressure the nation-state into 
changes towards greater integration, as doing so maximises their own benefit. For supranational 
institutions, working with actors below the nation state is a more efficient way of increasing 
supranational powers as it legitimizes the institution and provides it with knowledge and expertise. 
On the other side, those actors below the nation state see greater benefits for themselves with more 
integration and thus lobby the supranational institution rather than the national government. As 
Haas states, “the process of community formation is dominated by nationally constituted groups 
with specific interests and aims, willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to 
supranational means when this course appears profitable” (Haas, 1958: xiv) and that “tasks most 
intimately related to group and national aspirations can be expected to result in integration even 
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though the actors responsible for this development may not deliberately work towards such an end” 
(Haas, 1964: 35). 
This process has three areas. First is functional spillover, where “integration in one sector may create 
problems that can only be resolved through further integration in other, related, sectors” (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006: 94). Put simply, integration that begins in one area will spill over into other areas, 
which will then also become integrated to achieve the original goal. This process will then repeat. 
Secondly, there is political spillover, where influential groups in society realize they cannot fulfil their 
aspirations at the national level, so they organize across borders for more influence. Finally, there is 
cultivated spillover, where common interests are upgraded to the supranational level. The 
supranational actor will be able to help member states resolve their differences by moving them to 
‘a higher level’, thus allowing more concessions by member states and, at the same time, increasing 
the mandate of the supranational actor. 
The theory of neofunctionalism was, by its own creator’s admission, “obsolescent” (Haas, 1975) and 
“a successful failure” (Schmitter, 1970: 836) during the Eurosclerosis of the 1970s. However, that did 
not mean that the theory was incorrect, but that it was in need of changes. One of the main 
academics in initiating these changes was Alec Stone Sweet, who reformed neofunctionalism to 
explain the continued push towards integration in the European Union. The focus became more on 
transnational actors and how as exchanges between them rise, so do the costs of maintaining 
separate national laws. These costs will, eventually, push states towards supranational institutions, 
which include a supranational organisation and common rules. As rules are established and 
hindrances removed, other new obstacles are found, continuing the push for more supranational 
power and spillover into other sectors (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). It is this cycle which this thesis 





On the other side of integration theory is intergovernmentalism, which puts the main actor as the 
state, with integration being more of a series of bargains among the leaders of the states rather than 
an independent process. The two main thinkers behind this theory are Stanley Hoffman and Andrew 
Moravcsik. Intergovernmentalism critiques neofunctionalist notions that the state is no longer 
important once integration begins and contends that integration is a purposeful action chosen by 
states as they feel there is more to gain from integrating than not. Any integration that would not 
benefit a state in the long term would be quickly undone. In addition, Hoffman contends that 
neofunctionalism overlooks the impact of external countries on the integration process, such as the 
effect that US involvement in European security had on members of the European Community – 
either pulling them away from Europe towards the Atlantic, or pushing them towards greater unity 
to counter the USA. Neofunctionalism is also accused of underestimating the ability of nation-state 
actors, especially major powers, to “stop or to slow down the building of a central political system … 
and the ability of national bureaucracies to resist the transfer of power to the new central one” 
(Hoffman, 1982: 30). Much like functionalism and neofunctionalism, which were updated to contend 
with the critics, intergovernmentalism was also reworked into a new theory. The new theory was 
called liberal intergovernmentalism. 
This theory tried to explain the decisions made by the European Economic Community to continue 
integration. Like intergovernmentalism, it sees the state as the main actor in integration, and posits 
a two-stage approach to integration. First, a state’s preference towards further integration is 
dependent upon the constraints and opportunities of economic interdependence. Secondly, the 
outcome of integration – whether it will happen or not and to what degree – is decided because of 
the relative bargaining power of the member states and the level of incentives integration produces, 
as it lowers transaction costs versus the loss of control of domestic policy. The final agreement will 
be one of the lowest common denominator, as all parties will need to be accommodated for the 
agreement to take place. Member states which have more of an interest in a certain agreement will 
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have to concede more for an agreement to be reached than member states who do not have as 
much of an interest, which also lowers the overall quality of the final agreement. 
Moravcsik focused his analysis on the ‘grand bargains’ of European integration – such as the Single 
European Act – and does not focus on the smaller day-to-day bargaining and agreements which also 
occur at a European level. In addition, another major problem with these theories is they imply that 
integration is easy – it only requires bargaining by states and a committal by larger states towards it 
and would start and stop because of converging, or diverging, preferences, but if that was the case, 
why has there been no further integration in North America? There is too little thought given to the 
political side of integration and a leader’s preference for sovereignty and self-determination rather 
than thinking about the economic approach to integration. 
1.5 Methodology 
This thesis will focus on library based research and will be based on qualitative analysis of 
integration attempts and theories of integration. Primary sources, such as treaties and resolutions, 
as well as secondary literature sources will be used to complete this work. The primary sources 
include, but are not limited to, the Organisation of African Unity Charter, the Abuja Treaty 
Establishing the African Economic Community and the African Union Constitutive Act. Secondary 
sources will include journal articles, books, newspaper articles as well as online sources. 
The two case studies used in chapter four – the African Union and the European Union – will serve as 
useful examples of the different paths an intergovernmental organisation can take when embarking 
on a route towards integration. A historical comparison has been done to illustrate the similarities 
and differences between the two organisations, though it is important to note that this is not a 
comparative analysis between the two – the path chosen by each organisation (supranationality vs. 
intergovernmentalism) is what is looked at and not the organization itself. The EU is a logical choice 
in this regard, as it is the most successful integration process to date and is a loosely based model for 
the AU, in regards to timelines and institutional bodies (Babarinde, 2007).  
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1.6 Limitations and Delimitations 
The research aim of the thesis is to explain why integration has not progressed as originally meant to 
in the continent. The aim is less to prove integration has not been effective, but rather to analyse 
why integration has not been effective. However, to analyse this ineffectiveness properly, this thesis 
must first show how integration in Africa has not been effective in fulfilling the principles of the 
treaties which guide the process. The organisations of integration which will be focused on are the 
African Union and its branches stemming from the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the African Economic 
Community (AEC), which are the eight regional economic communities. Other organisations which 
fall outside of these, such as the Southern African Customs Union, will not be covered.  
The integration efforts to be looked at will be those attempted by independent African states and 
will not include attempts at federation or integration started and stopped before the end of 
colonialism. While the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Union will be looked 
at in chapter four, this is not in a comparative manner but in an illustrative fashion to show the 
different paths of integration an organisation can take at its beginning.  
1.7 Structure of the Study 
The study will be structured in three parts. Chapter 2 will outline the definitions for terms used in 
the study, as well as give a background on the history of integration attempts in Africa and show that 
they have been ineffective. Chapter 3 will look at why these attempts have been unsuccessful and 
integration has been ineffective. This will be explained by looking at the neo-patrimonial state of 
politics on the continent which results in a lack of political will towards integration, as it would result 
in a loss of power for state leaders. Chapter 4 will continue by analysing the two paths leaders can 
take in regards to integration – intergovernmental and supranational - and whether the process can 
function without leaders devolving power to a supranational institution. Chapter 5 will conclude the 
study.   
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Chapter 2: Context and Background 
This section will outline the definitions needed for the thesis, followed by a look at the reasons and 
advantages of integration for states. The section will conclude with a background of integration 
attempts in Africa, which will focus on whether integration in Africa has been ‘effective’, according 
to the definition given.  
2.1 Definitions 
Before any analysis can begin, it is important to first outline the definitions of terms that will be 
used. Region, supranationality, integration and what will be referred to as ‘effective integration’ will 
be defined. Neopatrimonialism will also be conceptualised, as it is a major factor contributing to 
Africa’s lack of effective integration. 
2.1.1 Region 
The term, ‘region’, can be used in many different ways depending on one’s field of interest and has 
been given numerous suffixes, such as regional, regionness, regionally, regionalism, regionalisation, 
as well as been paired with other words, such as integration, disintegration, cooperation, building 
and so forth. As this thesis focuses on formal, institutional integration between states, it will not go 
into much unneeded detail regarding the regionalisation of Africa, but will focus on the term ‘region’ 
as it would be understood for formal regional integration. Hettne defines a region simply as “a 
limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and a degree of mutual 
interdependence” (Hettne, 2006: 544). However, this can be seen as a definition of ‘old regionalism’, 
which was most prevalent after WWII during the rise of European integration, but has been replaced 
by what is aptly termed, ‘new regionalism’. Regionalism re-emerged in the 1990s, as the world 
moved from bipolarity to the possibility of a uni- or multipolar world and the new superpower, the 
USA, became more partial towards the idea of regionalism. This was combined with a growth of 
globalisation and interdependence between states and a change of attitudes among developing 
countries towards the neo-liberal economic order (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2000: 457) and resulted 
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in a new flurry of regional integration agreements around the world. This ‘new regionalism’ took into 
account the fact that a regional frontier may cut through states, with some parts of the state a part 
of this emerging region while others are not (Hettne, 2000:462), causing even further confusion for 
the study of a ‘region.’ There are also discrepancies on whether Africa has moved on to "new 
regionalism", which "go[es] beyond the mere dismantling of trade barriers and cover, for example, 
sanitary measures, liberalisation of trade in services, investment and competition disciplines, or the 
free movement of people" (Bachinger and Hough, 2009:45). Many of the 'old regionalism' projects in 
Africa have failed, but have been replaced by new efforts by African leaders, who try to use regional 
integration as a way to show the electorate they are responding to globalisation, when in reality the 
integration attempts never reach their full potential. This study, which focuses on the geographical 
continent of Africa, will use the term ‘region’ to denote a grouping of states that are linked together 
by borders or a mutual agreement, as per Hettne’s definition. 
2.1.2 Supranationality 
The term supranationality is not as contested a term. Many see it, simply, as a level of governance 
above the nation-state. To expand on this idea, this thesis will use Etzioni’s classification of 
supranationality, which breaks the term down into several elements. For a body to be termed, 
‘supranational’, it must contain one of the following elements. First, the decision making instrument 
of the body must not be made up of national representatives, i.e. individuals nominated by their 
country to work at the supranational body. The decision makers must have no loyalty to their home 
state and must follow the rules, policies and values of the supranational body rather than be 
instructed by their national governments. Second, the member states of the supranational body, as 
well as the citizens, corporations and unions of the nation state, are expected to adhere to the rules 
and decisions of the supranational body, even if contradictory to national regulations. Finally, and in 
regards to the second criterion, supranational bodies may have an enforcement capability, whereby 
they can fine member states who do not follow supranational rules (Etzioni, 2001: xix). By this 
definition, one can identify the European Union as a full-fledged supranational body, as the 
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European Commission (the EU’s supranational institution) is composed of European civil servants 
who are not instructed by their national governments. In addition, decisions by the Commission, and 
other institutions such as the European Court of Justice, are binding on nation-states, as well as its 
citizens, corporations and unions.  
The definition of supranational used for this study does not include Etzioni’s prerequisites for full 
supranationality, which he believes are necessary for supranationality to advance to full maturation. 
For Etzioni, these include: legitimate control of the means of violence; allocation of resources among 
the member units; and command by the supranational body of the political loyalties of individuals 
that exceed that of their loyalty to their nation-state (Etzioni, 2001: xxii).  
2.1.3 Integration 
Unlike supranationalism,  the term ‘integration’ has been more contested, as one can speak of 
market, economic or political integration, as well as integration that moves decision making to a new 
centre or to a collective decision making system.  All definitions have different end points, but share 
similar criteria which gives a good indication of what ‘integration’ refers to.  Balassa’s definition of 
economic and market integration outlines the several forms integration may progress through: a 
free-trade area; a customs union; a common market, an economic union; and complete economic 
integration. He also notes that there is a difference between integration and cooperation, which is 
useful for a definition of integration. Cooperation refers to actions that will lessen discrimination, 
while integration refers to measures which will completely suppress some forms of discrimination 
(Balassa, 1961). Therefore, agreements which merely lessen discrimination on goods, such as the 
North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), would not qualify as integration, but as cooperation.  
Mattli expands on the definition of economic integration, which he defines as “the voluntary linking 
in the economic domain of two or more formerly independent states to the extent that authority 
over key areas of domestic regulation and policy is shifted to the supranational level” (Mattli, 1999: 
41). Haas’ definition is similar to this, but also includes political integration, which would include 
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policy regulation in areas that are not centred on economic policy, such as foreign policy or security. 
Haas, like Mattli, also sees a shift of decision making power away from the state, and defines 
integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958: 16). 
For both of these definitions, integration has been defined by states surrendering some sort of 
authority to a higher level than the nation-state.  
On the other hand, Lindberg defines political integration as occurring when groups of states 
regularly make and implement common decisions that are binding on all states, with decisions made 
by collective institutions or processes (Lindberg, 1971: 45-46). In this definition, integration can 
occur just by the process of collective decision making, even if the decisions are made by heads of 
government rather than a supranational institution. Similarly, Nye defines political integration as a 
process, which leads “to political community – a condition in which a group of people recognizes 
mutual obligations and some notion of a common interest” (Nye, 1966: 84). This definition, like 
Lindberg’s, does not presuppose an overarching institution over the states, but rather just an 
acknowledgement that decisions must be mutually agreed upon. For example, this would include 
free trade agreements such as NAFTA as integration, since the binding decisions were made by the 
heads of government, which would not be the case for the definitions by Mattli and Haas, nor 
Balassa.  
For the purposes of this thesis, integration can be seen as occurring when policy decisions are made 
by a group of nations or by a collective institution, and these decisions are binding on those states 
involved. This definition would include decisions made by the supranational European Commission, 
as well as smaller integration efforts such as RECs and FTAs and decisions made by international 
organisations in an intergovernmental manner, such as the African Union. With the definition of 
‘region’ above, the term ‘regional integration’ will refer to the states linked in a geographic area and 
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with mutual interdependence coming together to pool their decision making authority and be bound 
by the decisions made. 
2.1.4 ‘Effective’ Integration 
Before looking at why integration has not progressed as intended, this thesis will first examine the 
integration process and show that it has not been ‘effective’. The word ‘effective’ refers to 
something being successful in producing a desired or intended result. For treaties such as the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty or the Chemical Weapons Convention, effectiveness would be if it 
influenced a state’s behaviour and they followed the guidelines of the treaty. For treaties of 
integration, effectiveness refers to the completion of the objectives outlined in the treaty or 
resolution which instigated the integration process. In Africa, despite the myriad treaties and 
documents signed by African leaders over the years, few of the goals that were mandated have been 
completed, or, as Mattli notes, “the signing of a treaty does not establish integration” (Mattli, 1999: 
12). For example, integration in Europe has been effective as the treaties, such as the Rome Treaty 
or the Single European Act, have been implemented according to what was mandated in the 
treaties, as have the initiatives in less grand integration treaties, such as NAFTA. However, the 
treaties signed by African leaders, such as those establishing the African Economic Community or the 
Pan-African Parliament, have yet to be implemented according to the mandate prescribed in the 
treaty and are, therefore, ineffective.  
2.1.5 Neopatrimonialism 
The term, patrimonialism, was initially used to refer to a form of traditional authority and a source of 
legitimacy, where there is a blurring between the public and private spheres of the state (Weber, 
1947). In other words, the ruled accept the authority of the ruler not because of a system of laws 
and rules, as in a legal-rational society, but because of a personal connection between the two. In 
small scale situations, this may help to cement social bonds through reliance on trust and 
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reciprocity, but in a larger situation, such as in state institutions, it will corrupt authority and distort 
power (Pitcher, 2009: 130). 
The ‘neo’ of neopatrimonialism refers to the pervasiveness of patrimonial structures of authority, as 
Weber states, but with the appearance of legal-rational institutions and bureaucracy. The concept is 
criticised by some as a ‘catch-all’ concept (Erdmann and Engel, 2007) which is difficult to pin down 
(Mkandawire, 2013: 6), though Christopher Clapham’s succinct definition of the term is shared by 
many writers. Clapham sees neopatrimonialism as “a form of organisation in which relationships of a 
broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed 
on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are 
formally defined, but exercise those powers… as a form… of private property” (Clapham, 1985: 48). 
Caddock states that Africa is stuck at this stage of political development – where the ‘big men’ at the 
top use national resources not for state betterment but for personal interest – for several reasons. 
First of all, communities are highly reliant on patrons and this system is seen as legitimate. There is 
little outrage about abuses of power and corruption by leaders, as citizens fight for change (in a veil 
of democracy) so that it will then be their turn to ‘eat’. Secondly, the legacy of colonial rule has 
reinforced this system, as governance has always lacked any sort of accountability and legitimacy 
and, finally, the large amount of foreign aid and the discovery of an abundance of natural resources, 
has helped to ‘grease’ the clientelist machine (Caddock, 2007). Similarly, Bratton and van de Walle’s 
work on neopatrimonialism and democracy has shown that the prospects for democracy are less 
when emerging from a neopatrimonial regime compared to a settler or corporatist regime (Bratton 
and van de Walle, 1994: 487) and this will have serious effects on African economic and political 
development, as well as on the integration process. 
2.2 Reasons for the Integration of Sovereign States 
Many scholars have weighed in on the pros and cons of integration and why leaders may choose to 
pool their sovereignty in a collective decision making institution. Those on the realist side of the 
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literature would argue that states will agree to pool their sovereignty with others if the relative gains 
of such a move are in their favour. Lloyd Gruber believes that international institutions, such as the 
UN or the EU, are not to the benefit of all states, as theories such as institutionalism believe, as 
states with more capabilities and power can dictate the rules of the institutions and can ‘go-it-alone’ 
if smaller states refuse to join. These smaller states, however, will join these institutions regardless, 
as they are better off joining them than not (Gruber, 2000). The Bretton Woods institutions are a 
good example of this, where the United States were able to dictate the rules – a liberal economic 
order – and smaller states were forced to join these institutions and follow these rules that were 
actually not in their best interest. On the other side of international relations theory, liberal 
institutionalism argues that “institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make 
commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the 
operation of reciprocity” (Keohane, 1995: 42). Therefore, it is in a state’s interest to be a part of 
these organisations, though it is important to note that the theory is not idealistic and does not 
believe that states will join for collective security – where no benefit is to be gained from 
cooperation, then cooperation will not happen.  
This cooperation is not the same as integration, but it is useful to recognize why states would be 
willing to join international organisations and cooperate. In terms of integration, there are several 
theories for why states choose to do so. Walter Mattli argues that, in regards to regional economic 
integration, two conditions need to be met for states to integrate, and to integrate successfully. 
First, there must be significant potential for economic gains from market exchange. In other words, 
the integration must result in trade creation, in line with Viner’s theory of custom unions which is 
explained in more detail below. However, demand is not enough for integration to succeed and 
economic institutional theories which believe it is the only factor are naïve in their assessment. 
There must be a fulfilment of supply conditions, which refers to the conditions needed for leaders to 
be willing to listen to and accept proposals for further integration. As Mattli notes, “willingness 
depends on the payoff of integration to political leaders; they may be more willing to deepen 
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integration if such a move is expected to improve their chances of retaining power, for example, by 
notably improving domestic economic conditions” (Mattli, 1999: 42). Mattli believes that integration 
would be more likely to occur in times of economic despair, when leaders felt more pressure to 
enhance the overall economy (Mattli, 1999: 51).  
In regards to integration in Africa, much of the literature reinforces that integration would be 
beneficial to the economy of the continent, as proven above. In addition, the depth of transnational 
problems on the continent – spill over of civil wars and rebellions, drought, climate change – mean 
that African leader should be pushing for more integration. It has been argued that there will be 
little chance of integration if there is no external or internal threat or if the state is relatively 
prosperous (Hazlewood, 1967: 4; Mattli, 1999: 51), but this has not been true of the situation in 
Africa. African states face vast economic despair and while this may partly explain the rhetoric 
behind the integration, it does not explain why integration has not been effective. What is missing 
for African integration is the supply condition – the willingness of leaders to move towards further 
integration. 
2.2.1 Advantages of Integration 
While debated, the ideas behind theories of institutions suggest that international organisations are 
a benefit for a sovereign society of states, as they create informational structures and reduce the 
uncertainty of enforcing agreements, thus helping states to achieve collective gains (Keohane, 1998). 
Integration takes this one step further and creates an interdependency between states as they share 
their sovereignty with an international organisation. In regards to Africa, there are several further 
reasons given to explain why integration would be a positive for the continent: to accelerate 
economic growth; increase bargaining power in the international arena; and increase good 
governance on the continent.  
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Accelerate Economic Growth 
One of the first steps towards integration, and one that has been attempted for several decades, is 
economic integration of African economies, which is currently being attempted via the Regional 
Economic Communities with the goal of accelerating economic growth. The reason this growth 
would happen is simple: lower (or no) tariffs as well as increased flow of trade among African states 
would make for the most efficient trading environment within Africa. The World Bank has stated 
that "it is reasonable to expect that, particularly in the case of West Africa, regional integration will 
contribute to accelerated growth" (Kaplan, 2006: 85) and Richard Mukisa gives several benefits of 
economic integration, including: encouraging specialization by permitting some domestic production 
to be replaced by intra-regional imports; enlarging the domestic market, which leads to economies 
of scale; allowing member states access to resources that otherwise would not be available; and 
making member states less vulnerable to adverse developments in the international market as there 
would be less reliance on it for goods (Mukisa, 1995: 69-70). Additionally, many African states do not 
have the infrastructure, population or resources to create a viable national market and, as former 
World Bank vice-president for Africa Edward VK Jaycox notes, “some progressive degree of 
interaction will be important for the competitiveness of Africa in the world economy [as] these small 
economies cannot produce economies of scale” (Mukisa, 1995: 68).  
Despite this, there are those who feel that Africa should concentrate more on the realities of 
globalisation and integrating with the world economy rather than with those in its region as 
preferential free trade agreements may result in protectionism and import-substitution rather than 
free trade (Lee, 2002: 1) or that Africa should focus more on rapid economic development rather 
than ambitious integration schemes (McCarthy, 1996: 230). However, there is no empirical proof 
that globalisation is in any way incompatible with regional integration and intraregional trade 
relationships (Kim and Shin, 2002). In other words, rather than wait for better economic conditions, 
advancing regional integration in Africa may lead to improved economic development and allow the 
continent to incorporate into the world economy. 
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This integration would most likely follow the steps outlined by Balassa above and would result in a 
customs union of the continent. Customs Union Theory, as expressed by Viner in 1950, would 
become either trade creating – where high cost domestic production is replaced by cheaper imports 
from member states – or trade diverting – where cheaper imports from non-member states are 
replaced by more expensive products from member states. The goal would be to reduce trade 
barriers between countries and promote economic efficiency in the allocation of resources (Biswaro, 
2012: 5), and for each country to take advantage of its comparative advantage. One could argue that 
as intra-African trade is so low, any form of integration towards a customs union would result in 
more trade diversion, but studies have shown that “regional integration arrangements in Africa 
induced significant levels of trade creation” (UN ECA, 2012: 39). In addition, Hazlewood noted in 
1967 that because of the economic structure of the underdeveloped countries in Africa which trade 
more externally than internally (which is still true today), customs union theory would suggest that 
there would be little to be gained from economic integration. However, he notes that customs 
unions are important because of the larger market they can provide for existing enterprises, but 
even more so because of the stimulus they can give to the creation of new productive capacity, 
particularly in manufacturing (Hazlewood, 1967: 7).  
Increased Bargaining Power 
Increased integration could also mean more common and harmonized positions among the member 
states, which will allow them to bargain more effectively in the international arena. This would be a 
huge advantage in negotiations which directly affect the African continent, such as trade, security or 
climate negotiations. Despite the AU Constitutive Act’s objective to “promote and defend African 
common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples” (AU, 2000: art. 3 (d)), this 
has not been the case. A good example of this was during climate change negotiations in 
Copenhagen in December 2009. As Africa is the continent that will suffer the most because of 
climate change (Blackwell Publishing, 2006), there was much rhetoric from African leaders about the 
need to finalize a solution. In preparation, an African Common Position was based on the AU’s 
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Nairobi Declaration (AU, 2009) and was followed at the beginning of the negotiations. However, the 
common position was marginalised as external influences, such as some African states relations with 
China versus other states relationship with the EU, meant that the African Common Position was 
merely rhetoric, and not a concrete solution to a problem which will affect all African states (Hoste 
and Anderson, 2010: 3-5). A shift from intergovernmental negotiations to a common position stated 
by an AU team representing the continent as a whole, much like the EU has for transnational 
problems, would have much more weight in these negotiations, resulting in a stronger international 
standing for the continent.  
Improved Governance  
Finally, governance could be improved as member states become more economically and politically 
interdependent. As Biswaro states, “another major benefit of economic integration is good 
governance . . . [which] is aimed at shifting power from the Government as the only actor to other 
actors in society, thus making power more diffuse, less prone to abuse, and in the service of as many 
interests as possible” (Biswaro, 2012: xxiii). In addition, states who integrate may be involved in joint 
production of public goods, such as transport networks to increase trade, which may have otherwise 
been too costly for one country to sponsor alone (Mukisa, 1999: 70). Integration could also push 
some of the decision making structures higher than some corrupt national governments and create 
an improved business environment in Africa, as badly administered state bureaucracies that smother 
reform are circumvented in favour of supranational organisations (Kaplan, 2006: 82). The increased 
interdependence of economies and societies will mean that any overarching structure above the 
states will function as a watchdog over a state’s economy and political situation. 
Integration will positively impact the lives of Africans, notes K.Y. Amoako, the executive secretary of 
the UN ECA: 
I want to see intra-African integration not because it will garner some utopian share of 
world commerce, but first and foremost because it will improve our lives here. It will 
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free up the time of African businesspeople to do business here. It will lower costs. It will 
make the African consumer's plight so much more hopeful. We must build for 
ourselves. If we do that, others will come (Kaplan, 2006, 89) 
2.3 A Background of African Integration 
The African Union, the successor to the Organisation of African Unity, is now slightly over a decade 
old and is the latest and grandest plan for unification and integration of the African continent. Plans 
for integration in Africa began before independence, via the Pan African movement at the start of 
the 20th century1. This section will examine the history of integration attempts in Africa and conclude 
that few of them can be deemed ‘effective’, according to the definition above.  
2.4 Integration in Africa 
The first calls for unity and integration in Africa actually occurred outside of the continent. In 
response to imperialism in Africa, the African diaspora in Europe and the United States convened a 
conference to discuss the way forward for Africa and Africans. Many of their resolutions centered on 
the ending of colonialism and self-determination for African peoples, as well as focusing on the 
future of the continent, which they hoped would unite politically. This section will briefly cover the 
history of integration in Africa, from its Pan African beginnings to its evolution toward the OAU and 
the AU and then analyse whether these attempts have resulted in integration that is ‘effective’, 
according to the definition above.  
2.4.1 What is Pan Africanism 
There are two main approaches to Pan Africanism. One is Afrocentric, which is a position that 
believes the longing for self-assertion on the continent began several millennia ago. The other, more 
subscribed-to approach, is Eurocentric, which sees Pan Africanism as a response to slavery and 
colonialism (Okhonmina, 2009: 86). Pan African scholar Tim Murithi agrees with the Eurocentric 
approach and sees Pan Africanism as “an invented notion with a purpose *and+ ... a recognition of 
                                                          
1
 For a full list of integration attempts in Africa, please refer to Appendix I 
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the fragmented nature of the existence of Africans, their marginalization and alienation whether in 
their own continent or in the Diaspora. Pan Africanism seeks to respond to Africa’s 
underdevelopment” (Murithi, 2005: 7). This study will also follow the Eurocentric approach and see 
Pan Africanism as a response to colonialism, and as the political philosophy behind African 
integration efforts. This philosophy has gone through three stages: Pan African congresses, which 
then evolved into the Organisation of African Unity, which was eventually transformed into the 
African Union. 
2.4.2 Pan African Congresses and Integration, 1900-1963 
During colonialism, there were several calls and attempts towards integration. There were  the Pan 
African Congresses, which were organised after the initial Pan African Conference held in 1900 in 
London. This conference, organised by Henry Sylvester Williams, set in motion the proceeding 
congresses, which were organised by WEB Du Bois. The reason these congresses are important is 
that they were some of the first official calls for an integrated, United States of Africa, type of 
political system. There were several of these congresses between 1900 and 1963, but the most 
important was in 1945 in Manchester, which was attended by African independence fighters such as 
Kwame Nkrumah, Hastings Banda and Jomo Kenyatta. The idea of Pan Africanism, which believed 
that “the self-determination of the dependent territories is the prerequisite to the federation of self-
governing states on a regional basis, leading ultimately to the creation of a United States of Africa” 
(Padmore, 1956: 22), has been seen as a key inspiration to African leaders, especially Nkrumah, in 
their quest for integration. The Pan African Congresses and the calls for decolonization were 
followed by other conferences, such as the Conference of Independent African States and the All 
African Peoples’ Organisation Conference, both in 1958. These two conferences held several other 
meetings, but were largely abandoned once the OAU was established. 
In regards to organisations of regional integration, nine attempts were made, though few were 
successful as only the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the OAU lasted longer than a few 
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years. The other attempts at integration during this period began with the Pan African Freedom 
Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in September 1958. The goal of this organisation 
was of full political independence, in this case after independence, of Kenya, Tanganyika and 
Uganda. In 1962, states from Southern Africa were brought in and the organisation was renamed 
PAFMECSA, though was abolished with the opening of the OAU. Other attempts also failed because 
of the beginning of the OAU or because of UN recognition, such as the Union des Républiques de 
l’Afrique Central, which planned for full economic and political union between Congo, Chad, the 
Central African Republic and Gabon in 1960. Gabon refused to ratify the charter and it ended when 
the states obtained UN recognition.  
There were also attempts at full integration of states, such as the failed Union of Independent 
African States in November 1958, when Ghana and Guinea united, later including Mali in 1960. This 
union was abolished after Guinea created closer ties with the United States, which was counter to 
the Marxist leanings of the other states. There was also the Mali Federation, between Senegal and 
French Sudan, which lasted just over four months before breaking up.  
As states gained their independence and flirted with the idea of integration, cracks emerged which 
split the states into different camps. The politics centered mostly on ideological alliances and 
territorial disputes. Nkrumah convened the first meeting of the Conference of Independent African 
States in 1958, with plans to hold a conference every two years. By the time of the second proposed 
conference, politics had overtaken the ideals sought pre-independence, and African states split in 
different directions in terms of unity and integration. Despite this, the African states still attempted 
to work towards unity and integration. One of the first important meetings to discuss setting up an 
organisation to work towards African integration was in Brazzaville in December 1960. This meeting 
included Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, 
Ivory Coast, Malagasy (Madagascar), Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and 
had a goal of commissioning a study of the prospects of integration, with a comparison to the 
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European Economic Community (EEC) and other international organisations. There were notable 
absences, especially of English speaking states and of Morocco, who felt that Mauritania was part of 
its territory and was unhappy with the Brazzaville Group’s calls for Mauritania’s admittance to the 
United Nations (UN).  
To counter this, the Moroccan king invited Ghana, Guinea and Mali, who had joined to become the 
Union of Independent African States, to Casablanca in January 1961 to document their own path to 
integration in Africa. They disagreed with each point from the Brazzaville declaration and introduced 
the African Charter, which was for a full union of African states and was supported by the four states 
mentioned, as well as Libya, Egypt, Algeria and the Congo Kinshasa. 
The groups differed in their proposed approaches to African integration. The Brazzaville Group 
wanted to take small steps towards integration, while still preserving their newly won sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, while the Casablanca Group proposed a full United States of Africa, with 
common economic and political policies with an emphasis on self-reliance, as dictated through its 
protocol of the African Charter and the Charter for the Union of African States. 
In May of 1961, President Tubman of Liberia, neutral of both groups, invited all states to Monrovia 
to attempt to mediate the problems between the two sides. The Union of African States (Ghana, 
Guinea and Mali) cancelled, citing inadequate preparations for the conference, Morocco refused to 
attend because of Mauritania’s attendance and Sudan and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and 
Syria) did not attend for unknown reasons. This left the Brazzaville Group as well as Nigeria, Somalia, 
Sierra Leone, Togo, Ethiopia, Libya Tunisia and Liberia. These states were then called the Monrovia 
Group and it was decided to hold the first conference of this new group in Lagos, Nigeria, where the 
Lagos Charter was approved. This document basically upheld the principles of the Brazzaville Group 
and also led to the establishment of the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), an intergovernmental 
organization meant to establish further cooperation between the member states but which became 
defunct in 1985. 
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The Lagos Charter also proposed a meeting in Ethiopia for the next conference in May 1963, after 
Algeria achieved its independence. All parties were present for the negotiations and, with this 
cooperation, a draft Charter – containing compromises between the two opposing groups – was 
passed and the Organisation of African Unity was born. 
2.4.3 The Organisation of African Unity, 1963-2002 
The OAU was established on 25 May, 1963 and was “an instrument which *African leaders+ hoped 
would lay the foundations for a continental union, or would at least lead to that degree of economic 
and political unity which is essential if Africa … is to prosper (Cervenka, 1968: 1). The major 
preoccupation of the new organisation was to end colonialism; however the stated end goal of the 
organisation was to promote integration in the continent. However, this proved quite difficult as the 
OAU was given little power. The Secretary-General was originally called the Administrative 
Secretary-General to emphasise that it was more secretary than general. In addition, the only 
criterion to join the OAU was to be an African state, effectively negating any leverage the 
organisation may have had to reform state behaviour, which the European Union (EU) has been able 
to do through its Copenhagen criteria, which defines the rules for whether a country is able to join 
the EU.  
The OAU was run as an intergovernmental organisation, which had contradictory purposes. One was 
to promote unity and coordination amongst African states, while at the same time defending the 
states sovereignty and territorial integrity. These objectives were put in to appease the two 
opposing camps, but made for an OAU that “was nothing more than a weak compromise 
organisation whose members were not as committed to political unity as their rhetoric suggested” 
(Mathews, 2008: 32). 
The rhetoric for integration continued however, as other organisations committed to integration 
were started and abolished. Many of the organisations started at this time became defunct, but 
were then reborn as RECs through the Abuja treaty which established the African Economic 
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Community. For example, in 1964, the Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale 
(UDEAC) was created between Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea 
and Congo, which became the Communauté Économique et Monétaire d’Afrique Central (CEMAC) in 
1994, with the goal of a full customs and monetary union. In addition, the East African Community, 
which had goals of a full federation between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, was created in 1967 but 
collapsed in 1977, although it was later revived with the same name. Finally, the Preferential Trade 
Area for Eastern and Southern African began in 1981 and later became the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
Some of the organisations created at this time are still around, including the Maghreb Permanent 
Consultative Committee, which was set up in 1964 to make proposals to accomplish the Maghreb 
Economic Community, of which Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco are member states. Additionally, 
there is the Mano River Union from 1973, which is an association to foster economic cooperation 
between Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire; the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS); the Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs; the Communauté 
Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale; the Indian Ocean Commission; and the Arab-Maghreb 
Union. These integration attempts will be analysed in more detail later to discover how effective 
their attempts at integration have been. 
This period of African history was one of more lows than highs, as there were numerous coups, civil 
wars, long periods of economic decline and failed development plans, such as the Lagos Plan of 
Action in 1980 and the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery in 1985. 
The failure of these plans, along with major changes in the international system as the Cold War 
ended, the fact that democracy was more firmly established in the continent and the European 
integration experience gathering steam, reignited the quest for integration once more and leaders 
“rededicated themselves to work assiduously towards economic integration through regional 
cooperation *and+ … they also expressed their determination to take urgent measures to rationalise 
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the existing economic groupings on the continent in order to increase their effectiveness in 
promoting economic integration” (OAU, 1998: 2). To do this, in June 1991, the Abuja Treaty was 
signed which created the African Economic Community and a step-by-step plan for economic 
integration, based over thirty-four years and following the same timeline and steps as the European 
Union. In 1999, the Sirte Extraordinary Session was convened to expedite the process of integration, 
which ultimately led to the Durban Summit in 2002, which launched the African Union. 
2.4.4 The African Union, 2002-Present 
The AU has been referred to as everything from “the final goal of African Unity that leaders have 
been pursuing for more than forty years” (Okhonmina, 2009: 86) to “the OAU without the O” 
(Landsberg and Mackay, 2003). It has been a change from non-interference to non-indifference and 
the AU has attempted to stick to these principles, with peacekeeping missions authorized by the AU 
Peace and Security Council in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and West Africa. 
It has also been a textbook change from the old regionalism of the OAU to a new regionalism, which 
is more outward looking in its approach, as opposed to relying on inward focused policies, such as  
Import-Substitution Strategies like the Lagos Plan of Action (De Melo et al, 1995: 159).  
This era also saw more regional organisations reborn, in line with the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the 
African Economic Community. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference became 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Drought and Development became the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996 
and the East African Community (EAC) was reborn in 2000. There were also many economic 
organisations that were established, all in the hopes of a common market, free trade area or 
monetary union in their region. These include the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the 
Communauté Économique et Monètaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD),  and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
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Finally, the Nile Basin Initiative was set up in 1999 to promote regional cooperation in some of the 
poorest areas of the continent. 
Recently, there have been steps to integrate the RECs, such as the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite 
Agreement, which is attempting to bridge all 26 states into a free trade area, as well as the Inter-
Regional Coordinating Committee between COMESA, EAC, IGAD and the Indian Ocean Community 
(IOC), which attempts to coordinate each of the RECs efforts towards regional integration. These 
much needed attempts to prevent membership overlaps are still in a transitory phase and their 
‘effectiveness’ still difficult to determine. However, this thesis’s analysis of the effectiveness of the 
participating RECs is a good indicator of the future of these agreements – if a smaller REC is unable 
to live up to its commitments, it is very doubtful that combining the RECs will help. 
Clearly, there has been no lack of integration attempts in Africa and the push in the new millennium 
has been commendable. However, rhetoric will always be just rhetoric unless the integration 
pursued has been effective, which is what this thesis will look at next. 
2.5 The Effectiveness of Integration in Africa 
As has been shown above, there have been many attempts at integration. Many of those attempts 
have failed or have been transformed into new organisations, as they were unable to achieve their 
original goals. The failure for these initial attempts at integration has been blamed on “the structural 
characteristics of the Sub-Saharan economies, the pursuit of import-substitution policies, and the 
very uneven distribution of costs and benefits” (Foroutan, 1995: 234) as well as on a lack of support 
from the USA towards regionalisation, which it saw as potentially discriminatory (Bhagwati, 1995: 
28). However, the failure of the original organisations is proof enough of their ineffectiveness and, in 
regards to those organisations that are still active, this thesis will look at the mandates and 
objectives of the organisations2 and analyse whether they have fulfilled them well enough to be 
labelled as ‘effective’.  This thesis will focus on the organisations that are most key to integration, 
                                                          
2
 Please see Appendix II for the major objectives of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities 
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namely the institutions of the AU and the AEC, rather than on the large number of African 
intergovernmental organisations, many of which can be labelled as either “dead”, such as the Mano 
River Union and the Indian Ocean Commission, or “zombies”, such as the Economic Community of 
the Great Lakes Countries (Gray, 2012: 12).  
2.5.1 The African Union 
The AU’s objectives are quite vague and very broad. These objectives include achieving greater unity 
and accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the continent, as well as promoting 
peace, security and democratic principles. As such, the AU should be seen as the overseer of the 
institutions of integration, as it attempts to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African 
countries and the peoples of Africa, while accelerating the political and socio-economic integration 
of the continent (AU, 2000). These institutions include the Pan-African Parliament, the Peace and 
Security Council, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, the African Investment Bank, the 
African Central Bank and the African Monetary Fund. The 8 RECs stemming from the Abuja treaty 
and the African Economic Community will also be assessed. 
2.5.2 The Pan African Parliament 
The PAP was originally set up to eventually be the legislative body of the continent, with full legal 
powers over member states. It became fully operational in 2004 in Midrand, Johannesburg, as an 
oversight committee and the plan was to be fully legislative by 2009. However, this still has not 
happened and the PAP remains merely an oversight committee and observer. Its recommendations 
to the African Union are rarely passed and its mandated objective to work closely with national 
parliaments and civil society rarely happens (Emmanual, 2010: 7). As the PAP has not become a full 
legislative body, nor has it fulfilled smaller parts of its mandate, one can say that the PAP has not 
been effective.  
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2.5.3 The Peace and Security Council 
The Peace and Security Council has been chosen for inclusion in this thesis as it is one of the most 
important institutions of the African Union and a good estimate of how effective the African Union 
has been in following its mandate, namely promoting peace and security on the continent. It has 
evolved out of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and the 
PSC Protocol came into force in December 2003. Its mandate is simple: promote peace and security 
in Africa; anticipate and prevent conflicts; and implement peacekeeping and peace building 
initiatives. While the PSC has become one of the more important institutions of the African Union, 
its record is mixed. It has suspended members, such as Togo and Madagascar, when a coup has 
taken place, but has also been quick to come to the aid of dictators such as Robert Mugabe and the 
late Muammar Gaddafi, as well as allowing Ethiopia to remain in the PSC chamber after it acted in 
Somalia without consent of the PSC. In regards to preventing conflict, the Council has acted more to 
extinguish conflict after it has started rather than prevent it, as it is mandated to do (Williams, 2009: 
609). Williams notes that the continent is better off with the PSC than without it (2009: 622), but the 
Council still has not lived up to expectations laid out in its founding protocol, such as anticipating and 
preventing conflicts and developing a common defence policy for Africa nor has the proposed 
African Standby Force (ASF) been quick to reach operational status, as called for in Article 13 of the 
PSC Protocol. 
2.5.4 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
The African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) is an amalgamation of the original African 
Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Despite the 2008 protocol, the 
treaty has yet to be ratified by the required number of states and is still not in force. The African 
Court of Justice, which never actually functioned, was to be the judicial organ of the African Union. 
The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, which does function and came into force in 2004, 
monitors states’ compliance with the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights. For the first 
several years, the court dealt mainly with administrative issues and despite officially starting its 
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operations in 2006, it wasn’t until 2010 that the court finally adopted its final Rules of Court (AU, 
n.d.). However, despite hearing some cases since that time, little progress has been made in 
protecting Africans' human rights via this court (The Economist, 2012).  
2.5.5 The African Banks 
The three banks, the African Investment Bank (AIB), the African Central Bank (ACB) and the African 
Monetary Fund (AMF) have been grouped together for analysis. All were created with the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union and are still not yet operational. The AIB is to be headquartered 
in Tripoli, Libya and will function similarly to the World Bank, distributing loans to its members for 
development projects. The AMF will function similarly to the International Monetary Fund and will 
be based in Yaoundé, Cameroon. Finally, the ACB will be the central bank of the African single 
currency and will encompass the AMF as well. This last bank is obviously reliant on the success of the 
RECs in fulfilling their goals, but the fact that none of the banks are close to being established speaks 
to the ineffectiveness in this area.  
2.5.6 The RECs 
The eight RECs that make up the AEC have remarkably similar objectives. The majority of them tend 
to focus on developing economic and social policies that are balanced, harmonious and deepen 
cooperation between member states. These broad words constitute a vague reference to the AEC’s 
step-by-step instructions for a move first towards free trade area, then to a customs union and, 
eventually, to a full continental economic union. 
On the whole, the RECs and the move towards free trade agreements has been the bright spot of 
African integration thus far, especially compared to the attempts mentioned previously. This in spite 
of the fact that in regard to the effectiveness of the AU, the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP), 
which was set up to monitor the integration progress of the RECs, states that the AU “is yet to fully 
play the role devolved upon it, namely: activities, projects and programmes designed to drive 
forward the process of regional and continental integration” (Minimum Integration Programme, 
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2010a: ii). However, it is the RECs that have the most impact on African states, as they are the ones 
that are charged with moving towards a full economic union. When looking at Table 1, it seems that 
integration in the continent seems to be progressing smoothly. 
Table 1: Stages of the Abuja Treaty and Achievements of the RECS 
 
Source: MIP, 2010a: 12. 
However, the first area to notice is the lack of the Arab Maghreb Union, one of the original eight 
RECs. Started in 1989, the AMU’s lofty objectives are to adopt common policy in all areas and to 
realize the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital between member states 
(AMU/UMA, 1989). However, due to political tension between member states over the situation of 
the Western Sahara, little progress was ever made in attempting to complete these goals. Despite 
the recent creation of an investment bank in the region (Arab Maghreb Union states create 
investment bank, 2013), no summit of the AMU has been convened since 1994, and while there may 
be a new drive towards integration with the implementation of new governments after the Arab 
Spring, thus far none of the objectives of the AMU have been achieved (Rouis and Tabor, 2013: 110). 
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Secondly, one should notice that the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has still 
not completed stage two, due to conflicts between and inside member states.  While the 
organisation has been actively pursuing peace in the region (in Sudan and Somalia) to varying 
degrees of success (Murithi, 2009), there has been no development on achieving the economic and 
political goals of their mandate, nor of the AEC.  
The other RECs have had a better track record. Having grown to include 28 member states, the CEN-
SAD is one of the largest RECs in the continent. A project of late Libyan leader, Col. Gaddafi, the 
organisation is trying to reposition itself with the changes in the Saharan region, with the first 
meeting since the revolution in Libya taking place in February 2013. The proposed FTA, which is 
vaguely stated as being "in progress", still has quite a long way to go and is nowhere near fulfilling its 
mandate. 
What else is alarming is the lack of information on the progress of the RECs and the contradictory 
information that is available. Table 1 was from 2010; Table 2 is from 2013. Notice that the progress 
of the CEN-SAD has actually regressed to where stage 2 (the gradual elimination of trade barriers) is 
no longer complete.  
Table 2: Status of the Implementation of the Abuja Treaty per REC 
 
Source: AU, 2013:19. 
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This seems to be the norm for the progress reports of the RECS and, while there have been some 
success stories, such as the EAC which has become a customs union, the timeline is rarely met and 
many obstacles have been in the way. COMESA, according to table 2, states that it has accomplished 
a customs union. The community, which replaced the Preferential Free Trade Area and contains the 
balance of African states on the east coast, from Egypt down to Swaziland, has as its objectives the 
goal to attain sustainable growth and development of the Member through harmonization and joint 
adoption of common policies (COMESA, 1993). However, COMESA still does not have a fully 
functioning Free Trade Area (FTA), let alone a common market or customs union, as member states 
still need to decide whether it is in their interest to join it or not (World Bank, n.d.). In addition, 
much like other RECs, the vague wording of the objectives, with references to “balanced”, 
“harmonious” and “joint” development, attempts to make it more difficult to measure the progress. 
However, as an REC under the AEC, its mandate is to follow a strict timeline leading to eventual 
economic union. According to the MIP, COMESA has concluded negotiations to become a FTA and 
was to become a customs union by 2009, which was signed. However, like the FTA not all member 
states have agreed to the union, because of fear of lost revenue, overlapping membership with 
other RECs, and a lack of political will.  
Other RECs have had similar problems. SADC, ECCAS and ECOWAS have continuously pushed back 
their timelines for a customs union. SADC and ECCAS had a goal of 2010 and ECOWAS was supposed 
to be fully functional by 2009 according to the 2010 MIP report, but this changed to having no fixed 
date for ECCAS and 2013 and 2015 for SADC and ECOWAS, respectively, in the 2013 edition of the 
AU's Status of Integration (AUC, 2013: 20). As the MIP notes, "these hesitant and indeed timid 
approaches seem to be evidenced by the different timelines that have been set, and then for the 
most part often postponed when due" (MIP, 2010a: 1). ECCAS, while having adopted protocols and 
set up a development bank, still has not made real progress towards completing their mandate 
(Uzokike, 2009:34), while SADC has also pushed back plans for their customs union. ECOWAS, which 
may have the most potential to fulfil its goals as many of the member countries already share the 
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common currency of the CFA Franc through the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(UEMOA), has also pushed back its timeline to become a full customs union. This, once again, shows 
the problems the RECs are having with fulfilling their mandate on time as dictated by their founding 
protocols. 
One must also remember that the decisions made by the RECs and the AU institutions are still 
dictated by the Heads of State. The AU is a purely intergovernmental organisation, with the AU 
Assembly, made up of the leaders of the member states, being the institution which decides to take 
action and set policies of the Union. In regards to the RECs, the final decision also ultimately rests 
with the heads of state. While some of the organisations have attempted to implement 
supranational commissions into their treaties, such as ECOWAS, SACU and the EAC (Fagbayibo, 
2013), these are rarely supranational in practice. For example, in ECOWAS it is the Authority of 
Heads of State and Government which is the supreme institution and the one in charge of the 
direction of ECOWAS (ECOWAS, 1993: art. 7(1)(2)), which leaves little room for the ‘supranational’ 
commission to function properly, which is the same for SACU’s Council of Ministers, the supreme 
decision making body of the customs union (SACU, 1992: art. 8(1)). One exception to this is the EAC, 
which has been able to set up a customs union, as well as a functional legislative assembly and 
regional court which, despite attempts by leaders to limit the EACs autonomy, has been able to be a 
part of decision making in the region. While the EAC Summit of Heads of State still has veto rights of 
the legislative assembly (Adar, 2005: 36), the EAC Court of Justice has been able to make rulings 
above the nation state, despite opposition from member states. A good example of this is when the 
Court disqualified nine Kenyan lawmakers from being sworn in as members of the East African 
Legislative Assembly (EALA). The judges found that the EAC treaty was at odds with the elections 
rules and Kenya and were, thus, invalid (van der Mei, 2009). Despite amendments to the EAC treaty 
to remove the judges, the Court held out and continued its legal rulings against the breach, 
developing case law and precedent for the Court. 
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So while there have been some success stories, one can see that integration in Africa is still 
disjointed and not moving at the pace originally set by the AEC. Nor are the RECs fulfilling the 




Chapter 3: Ineffective Integration in Africa: Neopatrimonialism’s 
Influence on Integration 
The previous chapter has outlined that integration would indeed be a positive for the continent, as 
well as given a background on the long and varied history of integration attempts in Africa, before 
concluding that the attempts made to integrate have, thus far, been ineffective. This chapter will 
focus on looking at why these attempts have been either unsuccessful or, in the case of attempts 
that actually have sustained, been ineffective. The chapter will first look at the possible reasons 
given for the lack of integration and conclude that, while not the only reason, the main reason for 
the lack of integration is the refusal of African leaders to properly implement treaties. This refusal 
would involve a loss of power for the state, which would then result in a loss of resources for 
patronage and, eventually, the leaders own national political power. 
3.1 Reasons for Lack of Integration 
Many reasons have been given for the lack of integration in Africa. The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa’s Assessing Regional Integration in Africa I states that the reasons for Africa 
falling short of its goals include: multiple and overlapping memberships; reluctance to adhere to 
integration programmes because of concerns over relative gains; insufficient technical and analytical 
support; divergent and unstable macroeconomic policies; inadequate capacity and resources of 
member states; lack of coherence and links among sectoral cooperation programmes; ineffective 
mechanisms for organizing, implementing, controlling, monitoring and revising the integration 
progress; and an inability to make integration objectives, plans and programmes part of a national 
development framework (UN ECA, 2004: 33).  
Mistry repeats many of these reasons in his own analysis of the situation, and adds in others, such 
as: unwillingness to subordinate immediate national interests in order to achieve long-term regional 
goals; an absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms; pervasiveness of parastatals, which 
are subject to political interference; African antipathy to markets, private enterprise and foreign 
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investment; political commitment to African integration being confined to a narrow coterie of 
political leaders and senior technocrats (Mistry, 2000: 558).  
In addition, the prevalence of political instability and inter- and intra-state ethnic conflict make it 
difficult for integration to proceed. In regards to the OAU and the AU, Okhonmina has argued that 
the transition from the OAU to the AU took place before the OAU achieved “organisational 
actualization,” so the OAU was still an inefficient organisation which was transformed into another 
inefficient organisation, and, as such, the AU is still an evolving organisation which has yet to reach 
“organisational maturity” (Okhonmina, 2009: 92-93). Therefore, the AU will continue to have 
bureaucratic and implementation problems which will make integration more difficult.  
However, almost all of these reasons for a lack of integration come down to political motives. Even 
the overlapping of membership is politically oriented, as the UN ECA found that half of the African 
states that join multiple regional organisations do so for political or strategic reasons, compared with 
only 35% who do so for economic reasons (UN ECA, 2006: xvii ). Ndulo notes that there is a “lack of 
political will in the member countries that is necessary to see integration succeed, expressed in the 
chronic non-observance of commitments undertaken with in the respective agreements and in the 
insufficient use of the instruments set up by these agreements” (Ndulo, 1992: 2). One can share the 
blame for the lack of integration on insufficient resources, unwillingness to implement and monitor 
programmes or political instability, but these all come down to political will to move integration 
further. This blame should be consolidated on the African leaders.  
In Hazlewood’s landmark book, African Integration and Disintegration, which was published in 1967, 
he remarks: “despite the speeches, the conferences, the resolutions, the quest for African unity 
seems to approach little nearer its goal” (Hazlewood, 1967: 3). This remark is still true today, despite 
continued rhetoric about furthering integration by leaders. At the AU inaugural summit, UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan warned leaders “not to mistake hope for achievement” (UNSG, 2002), 
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as African Heads of State seem more willing to sign a declaration of intent rather than actually 
implement any policies that will lead towards integration. 
3.2 Why African Leaders Fear Integration 
As mentioned above, integration in Africa would be positive for the continent and leaders have 
continued their statements of intention towards further integration, as illustrated by the Accra 
Declaration of 2007, which reiterated the push towards a United States of Africa and accelerating 
economic and political integration. So why do leaders refuse to take the steps needed to accomplish 
these goals? This section will look to answer this question by first looking at why states integrate and 
the possible reasons leaders have for not following the steps toward integration, as outlined in the 
treaties and declarations. Secondly, this thesis will argue that African leaders are reluctant to give up 
too much control over national resources and power for fear that it would lead to their own political 
end, as they rely on state resources to preserve their base of clients, which are needed to help them 
to stay in power. 
3.2.1 African Leaders and Integration 
This section will look at why African leaders may be hesitant to move towards further integration. 
The section above looked at the reasons why states will or will not integrate – this section will look 
at why that integration does not happen in Africa and argue that for both economic and political 
integration, leaders are loathe to cede any power – be it a loss of financial power or sovereignty – as 
this would limit their neopatrimonial opportunities and their grip on power. In regards to a push 
towards economic integration, such as a customs union or monetary union, Geda argues that there 
is little willingness among some governments, in Africa and around the world, to surrender the 
sovereignty of their macroeconomic policy making to a regional authority; face potential 
consumption costs that may arise from importing from a high cost member country; accept unequal 
distribution of gains and losses in the short run at the beginning of integration; and discontinue 
existing economic ties with non-members (Geda, 2007: 359).  
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In terms of political integration, the main deterrent towards this end is a desire to preserve 
sovereignty. The EU, the integration attempt which has proceeded the furthest, is now caught in a 
quagmire as it attempts to balance a financial crisis which requires more power being transferred to 
the supranational organisation against European countries desires to preserve their sovereignty, or 
their own decision making powers. In his attempts at uniting the continent, Nkrumah pushed 
integration directly from the end of colonialism, for fear that if sovereignty was not sacrificed while 
it was new, leaders would grow increasingly reluctant to sacrifice it (Nye, 1966: 14). Nkrumah’s 
prescient thought held true, and the idea of sovereignty has become the main excuse given from 
leaders to not follow integration agreements. This began in the newly independent states, where 
there was a tendency for national politics to be built around ‘heroes’ (Hazlewood, 1967: 359) who 
fought for independence and the newly won sovereignty. These ‘big men’ exploited the divided 
populations from the legacy of colonial borders and saw “any competition for power as a zero-sum 
game *which enabled+ elites to exploit identity divisions for personal gain” (Kaplan, 2006: 83). The 
end result was an African state which was an extension of a traditional patrimonial system combined 
with features of a legal-rational bureaucracy left over from colonialism, which was inherited by 
African elites (Chabal, 1999: 12-13). This neopatrimonial system, which occurs in many African 
political institutions, means that the fear of losses associated with economic and political integration 
causes leaders to be hesitant, if not hostile, to pushing integration further as doing so may mean a 
loss of their own national power. 
3.2.3 Neopatrimonialism in Africa  
In traditional patrimonial societies, which have existed in Africa and many other areas, there is no 
distinction between the public and the private - the state was the personal domain of the rulers and 
they would use the resources of the state to maintain the obedience of the population (Pitcher et al, 
2009:127). Neopatrimonialism is similar to classic patrimonialism, which Weber referred to as a form 
of government that is based on a rulers’ family household and the right to rule is attributed to an 
individual rather than to an office (Camic et al, 2005), but the "neo" part, although debated (Pitcher 
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et al, 2009; Erdmann and Engel, 2007), refers to the fact that, unlike traditional patrimonialism, 
there is a separation of the private and public in neopatrimonial states, though it is largely a facade. 
In addition, neopatrimonialism regimes occur where “the chief executive maintains authority 
through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law” (Bratton and van de Walle, 
1994:458) and can be defined as “states that, despite possessing the formal structures of modern 
bureaucracies, operate on patrimonial principles – characterised by personalised political authority, 
weak checks on the private appropriation of public resources, and pervasive clientelism” (Alence, 
2004:165). The clientelism referred to can be defined in a political manner as “an exchange 
relationship between unequals, which provides a political advantage to the more powerful agent 
and a material advantage to the less powerful agent” (van de Walle, 2007: 2).  
The occurrence of neopatrimonialism in Africa has its roots in colonialism. Many African states, such 
as Rwanda and Burundi, used a traditional patronage system to structure the whole population, 
from the king to the peasant, with a patron-client organisation (Medard, 1982: 166).  Even as 
colonialism instituted formal structures of governance, the redistributive logic of patronage – a 
pyramid-like structure in which patrons at the top distribute their resources to clients below them, 
who then do the same to their clients below them – continued and was implemented in the highest 
areas of the state (Beekers and van Gool, 2012: 8). In colonialism, those at the top of the pyramid 
were replaced by the colonialists, who then became the patrons to their clients, the chiefs. As a 
legal-rational system of governance was instituted, means by which patrons operated changed. They 
relied more on their access to government, which became the most profitable occupation during 
colonisation and after independence, and less on the amount of land they owned or how many 
people they employed. Those who were able to allocate government jobs became important patrons 
for clients who fought for independence, and those elites who were able to secure access to these 
positions quickly worked their way up in government. Those who were very skilled and “could 
manage political opponents effectively and keep potential insurgents in check … could endure for 
decades. To do this, rulers needed to ensure that sufficient resources trickled down to their clients 
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to keep the majority satisfied” (Williams, 2011: 64). Chabal notes that even with the increase of 
democracy on the continent, the neopatrimonial system still endures, as either the previous 
incumbent is voted back into power, such as Kerekou in Benin or Ratsiraka in Madagascar, as there is 
still a strong link between client or patron or, where a new leader is elected, they are hamstrung to 
implement proposed reforms as a large number of new supporters, and clients, expect rapid pay-
offs (Chabal, 1999: 35-39).  
The situation in other democratic states can also be defined as a patron-client relationship, as 
leaders in democracy regularly promise and deliver special services or resources to local areas in 
return for continued support during elections. These ‘pork-barrel politics’ are commonplace in many 
democracies and other types of government (Lancaster, 1986). However, in Africa, leaders are less 
concerned with satisfying the public by providing services than by satisfying the elites which keep 
them in office and power. Leaders are also concerned with enriching themselves, leading to policies 
which are to the detriment of the general population. As Williams states, “while African leaders were 
often guilty of spending relatively vast sums of money on personal or ‘white elephant’ projects such 
as stadiums, palaces or lavish conferences, arguably the most serious problem for neopatrimonial 
rulers was that the unavoidable balancing act of elite co-optation encouraged them to adopt policies 
which increased the likelihood that their state would suffer an economic crisis” (Williams, 2011: 62) 
and Chabal reiterates "with very few exceptions, African governments simply exploited their 
economic assets for patrimonial purposes, regardless of the consequences of such actions for the 
country's future economic well-being" (Chabal, 1999: 113). 
The risks to a leader’s rule may be heightened when external resources – political and financial – run 
out and rulers are unable to continue their clientele system. There is a constant balancing act to 
preserve the equilibrium between maintaining the stability of the population and maintaining the 
leader’s status among the elites in society (Williams, 2011). While disorder such as small civil wars 
between the ruling party and the opposition may be used by the leader to consolidate his power, 
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conflicts that affect the leader’s power are more likely to happen when rulers are “no longer able to 
assert their dominance over local strongmen in their patronage network” (Reno, 2007:328). For this 
reason, African leaders will find it more difficult and time consuming to retain power, even for a full 
term of office, than counterparts in Europe or places that are centred around more legal-rational 
forms of governance, as “regimes built on personal loyalty rather than bureaucratic authority are 
susceptible to institutional collapse when patronage resources run out” (Bratton, 1994: 460-461). In 
addition, those beneath the patron in government will have little choice but to maintain the regime, 
as Bratton notes that government insiders “derive their livelihood from state or party office. Because 
they face the prospect of losing all viable means of support in a political transition (like to a 
supranational actor), they have little option but to cling to the regime and to sing or swim with it” 
(Bratton, 1994: 464).  
3.2.4 Neopatrimonialism’s Effect on Integration 
This type of governance is detrimental to integration, as it may result in a loss of state revenue from 
reduced tariffs and diverted trade, or may limit a leader’s political sovereignty in some areas. This 
thesis will argue that for political or full economic integration to occur as African leaders have stated, 
there must be some transfer of power to RECs or another body such as a Pan-African Parliament, but 
neopatrimonial states are wary of allowing these organisations to function independently (Hoste, 
2011: 9).  Neopatrimonialism affects integration in two major ways. First of all, integration of states 
politically and economically will require the state to undergo a degree of institutionalisation and 
modernisation, which would be the end of patrimonialism (Chabal, 1999:5). The reason for this, as 
indicated above, is that integration will result in a loss of economic resources for the neopatrimonial 
state, as well as political power as there is a loss of some decision making capabilities for state 
leaders. Mistry writes that the African elite are “understandably reluctant to accelerate a paradigm 
shift that weakens their power and reduces opportunities for satisfying the private agenda of public 
officials” (Mistry, 2000: 558) in regards to a shift from state to market-oriented development, but 
this can apply to a shift towards further integration as well. Bach states that a "ruler owes his ability 
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to remain in power to his capacity for transforming his monopolistic control over the state into a 
source of opportunities for family, friends, and clients" (Bach, 2012: 27) and this shift towards 
further integration will result in leaders being unable to continue their patronage networks. The 
result will be a crisis, due less to a loss of legitimacy and more to dissatisfaction with the patron and 
political manoeuvres by other patrons attempting to gain power, eventually resulting in a change of 
leadership. In areas such as Europe, integration has progressed to respond to threats or crises. In 
Africa, leaders fear integration for the fact that it could cause a crisis and limit the resources they 
use to remain in power. 
Secondly, neopatrimonialism affects integration as any integration that does take place, such as the 
progress of the RECs, is done more as a response to demands from international donors than as a 
way to increase the standard of living of the states' citizens. Similar to the imposed implementation 
of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), leaders see 
integration as a challenge they need to overcome. On one hand, donors are asking for further 
integration in exchange for aid and preferential trade access, which is needed to appease the 
leader’s clientele base. On the other hand, further integration will result in fewer opportunities for 
leaders to use state resources as a patronage tool, resulting in challenges from other patrons and 
potential loss of national power. When faced with a similar issue with the SAPs, African leaders 
attempted to delay the reforms and undermine their effects in other ways, such as using them as a 
scapegoat for Africa's continued economic decline and by following the path of least cost, meaning 
that African leaders lose little, but foreign donors are obliged to continue their aid as leaders are, on 
the surface, doing what is required of them (Chabal, 1999: 122). This has also happened in regards to 
integration. It was shown above how leaders continually delayed the integration process, pushing 
back dates or ignoring them altogether. Where they could not do this, as in the regional push 
towards free trade areas and customs unions, they have only implemented the minimum 
requirements needed to make it seem like integration has been successful, so as to continue support 
from foreign donors. An audit by USAID’s Southern Africa Trade Hub found that member states were 
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not complying with the basic obligations of the FTA and the issue of non-compliance is barely 
mentioned by SADC (Nevin, 2013). 
3.2.5 African Leaders and Power 
But why do African leaders seem unable to relinquish some power and do what is best for their 
country? While a leader refusing to give up power is by no means unique to Africa, there has been a 
definite pattern of African leaders refusing to leave office peacefully. Violence in Kenya and Côte 
d’Ivoire has resulted because of a leader’s refusal to leave office and Africa has had a long history of 
‘big men’ in power since independence, such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire and Sekou 
Touré in Guinea. Even with the introduction of term limits in much of the continent in the early 
1990s, many elected leaders, such as Sam Nujoma in Namibia and Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, 
have changed the constitution to allow themselves to remain in power. Several reasons could be 
given to explain a ruler’s decision to remain in power. Some authors argue that leaders stay in power 
and commit the crimes they do because, simply, nobody is able or tries to stop them (Ayittey, 2011; 
Mills, 2010). Many African leaders argue that the lack of development in Africa is because of the 
experience of colonialism, so their refusal to give up power is due to a fear of the loss of sovereignty 
and independence, such as during colonial times. Of course, the problem with this argument is that 
the shift of political parties is to an African party, and not to a foreign colonial state. Along this same 
vein, an argument could be that a loss of power resulting from integration will also mean a rise of 
power from regional hegemons, such as Nigeria or South Africa, which will be to the detriment of 
smaller states. Several scholars have argued that both Nigeria and South Africa are attempting to use 
integration and regional organisations, such as the AU, SADC and ECOWAS, as tools to increase their 
hegemony on the continent (Adebajo, 2010: 414; Lesufi, 2004: 809-829; McGowan and Ahwireng-
Oben, 1998: 165). The problem with this is that the continuing leadership of an African ruler of a 
small African state, especially a corrupt one, will do little to change South African and Nigerian 
foreign policy, so there is little reason to prevent integration on these grounds. 
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In the same vein of neopatrimonialism, many others see African politics as the place to make money 
in Africa, to reward patrons and themselves. Undoubtedly, for many African states the public sector 
is where there are possibilities to become rich, as opposed to the private sector. Many African rulers 
have used the state as their own personal bank and money-making venture, such as Senegal’s 
Abdoulaye Wade who believes he should receive 35% of revenue generated from a $27 million 
statue built in Dakar since it was his idea (Sy, 2009). There has been an attempt to negate this trend 
by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which awards African leaders for exercising good leadership and 
performance during their time in office with five million dollars after they leave office and two 
hundred thousand dollars a year for the rest of their lives. The hope is this will give an incentive to 
leave office and not have to steal from the state treasury. Unfortunately, the prize has not been 
given out in previous years because of a lack of worthy candidates (Ibrahim Prize, n.d.). This, and the 
fact that many former African leaders, such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Muammar Qaddafi of 
Libya, are alleged to have billions of dollars’ worth of investments and cash, proves that leaders do 
not refuse to leave power for fear of losing financial security.   
Ultimately, David Shinn, talking about African leaders’ penchant for constitutional changes, sums up 
the situation best when he states, “those who change (their country’s) constitution simply want to 
extend their power. They decide that they like the position that they are in, that it provides them 
with the ability to extend a certain amount of patronage that is probably very satisfying to their ego. 
Theirs is nothing more than a desire to remain in power. Pure and simple” (Gombya, 2010). Again, 
this is not a feeling unique to African leaders. Jean Chretien, former Prime Minister of Canada, stated 
explicitly that “politics is about wanting power, getting it, exercising it and keeping it” (Chretien, 
2007: 2). Despite this, Chretien left office peacefully, so why don’t African leaders? 
There are two factors that contribute to the extreme numbers of African rulers who refuse to give 
up power. The first is the ruler’s image of themselves and the second is a lack of institutional power. 
While one could argue that African leaders have ‘a big ego’ and, therefore, feel they are best to run 
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the country or that they fear leaving office because of reprisals from opposition and loss of revenue, 
this thesis argues that there are deeper issues. First of all, many African rulers strive to gain 
recognition as ‘the Big Man’, similar to the role played by Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire or Dos 
Santos of Angola. There have been some studies that suggest that the period of the ‘Big Man’ has 
declined, as there are fewer irregular (i.e. overthrow by violence) changes of government (Posner 
and Young, 2007; Diamond, 2008). However, they also admit that “African leaders today *do not+ 
have any less desire to stay in power than their predecessors did; ... simply that leaders today are 
more constrained by formal rules in trying to achieve their most preferred outcomes” (Posner and 
Young, 2007: 137). While more formal rules and desire for international approval may constrain 
leaders to a certain degree, it still does not entirely erase the desire to remain in power as ‘the Big 
Man’ since this phenomenon continues today. This position of power is aggravated via the neo-
patrimonial system of African politics, as the form of the modern state is fused with “the informal 
reality of personalized, unaccountable power and pervasive patron-client ties” (Diamond, 2008: 
145). These ties filter down to the mass of the population, which is dependent on local patrons of 
the ruler. This dependence adds to the personal image of the leader as ‘the Big Man’, as there is 
little dissent towards his rule. The African electorate has not pushed for major reforms which would 
end this neo-patrimonial rule, because they fear the short-term pain it may cause or because the 
neo-patrimonial system is so entrenched that the population expects to exchange political support 
for help, hence they are more likely to vote for a member of their tribe in exchange for sharing any 
financial gain that politician may accumulate (The Economist, 2004). This also explains why African 
populations are more likely to turn to violence if their particular candidate loses an election, as this 
loss will mean that the financial gains will shift towards a different electoral base.  
Secondly, there is a weakness of institutional power in African states, which, if strong, could help to 
balance the power of rulers. As stated before, many constitutions are weak and rulers have changed 
them to suit their interests, such as choosing to abolish term limits. Conversely, the patronage 
system is very strong and this creates conditions where a ruler can continue in power without much 
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opposition. The “absence of effective institutional restraints is undoubtedly a critical consideration 
which disposes ambitious individuals or groups with access to power to contemplate and engage in 
unlawful bids for political control” (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984: 432). Africa’s leaders’ refusal to take 
integration seriously stems from the fact that doing so will impact their political power negatively. 
Further integration will only serve to strengthen institutions and minimize their resources for 
patronage, which helps to keep rulers in power. The desire to remain in power is not a phenomenon 
unique to African rulers, but the fact that it is not difficult to remain in power in Africa makes this 
desire a reality. 
 Therefore, leaders use the political rhetoric of integration to convince international donors and 
citizens that they are working to rectify the economic despair on the continent, while refusing to 
advance regional organisations beyond an intergovernmental manner of decision making. Leaders 
prefer an intergovernmental approach and view an organisation with supranational powers as a 
departure from a familiar and predictable path (Nzewi, 2009: 4), and “given the prevalence in Africa 
of weak states and political opposition to sharing sovereignty, it is not surprising that integration 
arrangements are characterised by loose supranational bodies and that virtually all institutions are 
intergovernmental” (Tavares, 2011: 226). Other authors agree that states, and their leaders, attempt 
to slow their integration so that other states integrate first, in an attempt to free ride and “defend 
the position of domestic interest groups, the support of which the political regime in question may 
be politically dependent upon” (Boas, 2001: 32) and that this suggests the importance of political 
issues, namely relating to the loss of sovereignty and lack of political commitment in regards to the 
issue of integration in the continent (Geda, 2007: 373).  
One can see that much of the blame for the impeded progress of integration in Africa rests solely on 
the shoulders of those leaders who put their personal wealth and power ahead of that of the state 
and its citizens. Voluntarily ceding power to a supranational institution would require an 
institutionalization of power and the state and "proper institutionalization of the state would 
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obviate the need continuously to have to display the substance of one's power. If political 
domination became embodied in the recognized juridical universe of the bureaucratic state, political 
elites would no longer have to justify their prominence through the fulfilment of their patrimonial 
duties. What this would mean, however, is that they would have to accept both the supremacy of 
institutions over individuals and the temporary nature of their political eminence"(Chabal, 1999: 15). 
Leaders, unfortunately, are loathe to do this and will prefer to a version of integration over which 
they have veto power. However, integration can only proceed so far if leaders refuse to cede power 








Chapter 4: Integration in Africa: Intergovernmental versus 
Supranationalism 
As expressed above, the trend in Africa has been towards regional organisations that are run in an 
intergovernmental manner. The question now becomes, can African integration lead to a full 
economic and political union in an intergovernmental manner? 
This chapter will focus on two theories, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, to show that 
integration cannot progress towards the goals African leaders have set in a purely intergovernmental 
manner. A supranational organisation is needed to direct and influence the process, and this first 
push will help to start Africa towards greater integration. Africa still has not had this push, and thus, 
still has not had effective integration. This chapter will first do a historical analysis between the ECSC 
and the OAU. The ECSC began as a supranational organization, compared to the OAU which started 
intergovernmentally.  Secondly, this chapter will use this analysis to look at how far integration can 
proceed if it continues to function intergovernmentally, concluding that it would be much more 
efficient if there were supranational elements involved in the process. 
4.1 The ECSC and the OAU 
4.1.1 Similarities 
The reasons that states integrate can be broken down into two areas: first, security and secondly, 
economics. States may integrate because of neo-realist fears of being attacked by a larger state, so 
are willing to give up some sovereignty for the safety of numbers and allies. Economics may also 
drive integration, if states attempt to increase their economies by improving interregional trade and 
investment through integration, which creates increased interdependence and further cooperation 
among states. Both the ECSC and the OAU were created for security reasons, which then continued 
and evolved into an economic union. The ECSC, established on April 18, 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, 
sought “to avoid the risk of future conflict between France and Germany by linking the two basic 
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elements in their economies, the production of coal and the manufacture of steel, more closely 
together” (Thody, 1997, 1). Europe had witnessed a century of war and was determined to do what 
it could to prevent further wars for the continued security of the continent. Similarly, the OAU was 
established in 1963, after a wave of decolonisation to secure their own sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence, as well as eradicate all continuing forms of colonialism (OAU Charter, 
1963: art. II, (c)(d)). Both organisations were originally created as a response to insecurity on the 
irrespective continents, either in the form of war or colonialism. Economically, both organisations 
transformed into economic-based organisations. The ECSC, which was very successful in its 
immediate economic objectives (Thody, 1997: 3), was the starting point for the European Economic 
Community, while the OAU, which was not as successful at economic transformation, was eventually 
transformed into the AU, with loftier economic development goals in Africa through the RECs.  
The path chosen for each organisation is also quite similar. Both rejected the idea of a grand ideal 
and wished to proceed step-by-step. The Schuman Declaration states that “Europe will not be made 
all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first 
create a de facto solidarity” (EUROPA, 2012), while African leaders shunned Nkrumah’s grand plan 
for a “United States of Africa” in favour of a more incremental path. The ECSC, comprised of only six 
members (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) opted for their 
integration through supranationalism and functionalism (Henig, 2002: 14), with a major push for this 
by Jean Monnet, a French statesmen who believed wholly in the idea of European integration and 
was the first president of the High Authority, the supranational arm of the organisation. As will be 
discussed below, the OAU did not take this path and instead followed a more intergovernmental 
form of decision making. However, just as there were controversies in Africa over the powers of the 
OAU, there were also controversies in Europe, though, with the exception of Communist nationals 
and some Republicans in the French Assembly, the arguments were not centred on the loss of 
national sovereignty, as in Africa (Mason, 1955). Much of the debate centred around the issue of 
democracy – an area that Schuman and Monnet did not give much attention to when drafting the 
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proposals for the ECSC – and suspicions of France’s ‘real’ motives and of a renewed Germany and its 
quest for hegemony (Mason, 1955: 22-29).  
It is not surprising that similarities abound between the two organisations. Much of the attempts at 
African integration (and in other parts of the world) have been modelled on the European 
experiment. That said, few of the integration experiments outside of Europe have progressed as well 
and for that, one must look at the major differences between the organisations. 
4.1.2 Differences 
There are, of course, differences between the two regional organisations. The ECSC started in 
Europe, where there was already a history of bureaucracy, democracy and governance, compared to 
the OAU, which was started by leaders with little political or leadership experience. The ECSC also 
had the full support of the USA, both economically via the Marshall Plan and politically via the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The OAU had little financial support and, perhaps because of other 
failed integration attempts, the international community had little hope for this new organisation. 
As Haile Selassie notes in his acceptance speech as the first president of the OAU: “there are those 
who claim that African unity is impossible, that the forces that pull us, some in this direction, others 
in that, are too strong to be overcome. . . They predict dissension and disintegration among Africans 
and internecine strike and chaos on our continent” (Selassie, 1963). 
However, the biggest difference between the two organisations was how the each was set up. The 
OAU, perhaps jealously guarding of their newly won independence, began as an intergovernmental 
organisation, and was based more on political cooperation than integration, as there was no move 
towards creating a new or larger entity (Mukisa, 1995: 57), while the ECSC was a revolutionary 
proposal, as states that joined had to sacrifice some national sovereignty over to a High Authority, 
which was given powers to reduce tariff barriers, abolish subsidies, fix prices and raise money by 
imposing levies on steel and coal production (McCormick, 2002: 66). However, despite the power 
possessed by the High Authority, its rulings were not always followed by the member states, as 
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illustrated by the refusal of Germany, France and Italy to follow the ECSC’s directive to declare a 
‘manifest crisis’ during a recession of the steel sector and oversupply of the coal sector in 1959 (Alter 
and Steinberg, 2007: 8). In addition, the move towards more political integration, as Monnet 
envisaged, did not come to light because the proposed European Defence Community was rejected, 
though there was still a continuance of supranational authority in the creation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) in 1957, 
though watered down relative to the High Authority of the ECSC. However, what is important to 
remember is that the OAU and its subsequent organisations never had this initial push towards 
supranationalism and that while “after five years of activity, the European Coal and Steel Community 
clearly had not brought with it a general enthusiasm for supranational institutions and federal 
powers in limited spheres, [it] gave an undoubted impetus to further integration (Haas, 1958: 110). 
It was this difference that set the divergent paths of the respective organisations: the ECSC towards 
an evolution of integration, leading eventually to the European Union, while the OAU was stuck on a 
path of intergovernmentalism towards empty resolutions and promises, concluding with the AU, 
which, while still modelled after the EU integration plan, lacks the “supranational decision-making 
authority of its European counterpart” (Hoste, 2011: 3) 
4.2 Intergovernmental Integration Without Supranationalism: The OAU 
Like many other attempts at integration, the OAU started its life in an intergovernmental manner. As 
mentioned previously, its main goal was the end of colonialism on the continent and leaders did not 
want to share nor lessen any of their newly-won independence and sovereignty. Through the 
transformation to the AU, the organisation has remained intergovernmental, despite attempts to 
implement a supranational parliament or central bank, for example. The reasons for this were 
explained above and the question now shifts: how far can the continent integrate if it continues its 
path in a purely intergovernmental fashion?  
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This thesis will argue that integration cannot proceed much farther than several preferential trade 
agreements between countries on the continent. The reason for this is that, as explained by 
Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism, the decisions made by the organisation are actually made 
by the heads of state, who will bargain with each other towards the lowest common denominator 
choice.  
The main idea behind intergovernmentalism is that, put simply, the decisions made by an 
organisation are still made solely by the states, which is the way that the African Union, and many 
other integration attempts, operate. This realist way of thinking posits that states will join 
organisations because it is in their best interest, but will refuse to give up any power or sovereignty 
that threatens their national interest. This theory, best presented by Stanley Hoffmann, is explained 
in more detail in chapter two, as is liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik’s theory is the main 
theory which will be focused on to show that organisations which remain in an intergovernmental 
mode of decision making will be unable to integrate effectively and reach a strong economic or 
political union. 
One must first look at how decisions, according to liberal intergovernmentalism, are made in an 
international organisation. The theory sees decisions of integration made by rational states, who 
weigh the costs and benefits of integration in regards to their national interest. These interests are 
the goals that states hope to realize as they bargain with other states – there is no input from 
supranational actors and domestic actors are only able to influence decisions through domestic 
political structures. The more a government wishes to see agreement on an issue, the less likely it is 
for that actor to leave the negotiations and, hence, the more concessions it will have to give up to 
realize its preferred goal. There is also a functionalist/liberal institutionalist role that is played, as the 
international institutions reduce the transaction costs and help in regards to monitoring and 
enforcement of the agreement (Moravcsik, 1993). 
64 
 
The major problem with organisations where decisions are made solely in this manner is that the 
decision chosen will always be one of the lowest common denominator. What this means is that as 
states bargain to accomplish their goals, they will need to make concessions so that a large majority 
of the members are happy with the outcome. This outcome will always be the one with the least 
cost to the states, and at the same time the least benefit to the majority of the states as well. 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union can be seen as a document that was developed in this way. 
The African states of the OAU decided, at an extraordinary meeting in Sirte, Libya in 1999, to 
accelerate the treaty of the AEC and to establish the African Union. Remarkably, the Constitutive Act 
was adopted less than a year later in Lomé, Togo and the document, while full of the usual rhetoric 
that has been mentioned before in this thesis, is also a compromise between states. According to 
Tieku, the main instigators of OAU reform were South Africa, Nigeria and to a lesser extent, Libya 
(Tieku, 2004). Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo, both newly elected presidents in 1999 of South 
Africa and Nigeria, respectively, wanted to use the reform of the OAU to further their foreign policy 
interests. Mbeki wanted to extend his policy of the “African Renaissance”, which was a way to frame 
neo-liberal policies in a way where South Africa could not be accused of being a pawn of the west 
(Landsberg, 2000: 106). Obasanjo wanted extra support for the Conference on Security, Stability, 
Development, and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), which he had tried to have passed by the OAU 
assembly since the early 1990s with little success. With domestic pressure to withdraw the ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) from Sierra Leone, Obasanjo needed to revitalise the CSSDCA which 
would give him the external support needed from other African countries to continue the campaign 
(Tieku, 2004: 259). The Libyan leader, Gaddafi, wanted to push African integration forward quickly, 
to demonstrate his loyalty to pan-Africanism and reignite his position in African geo-politics.  
As liberal intergovernmentalism showed, each of these leaders had specific goals they had hoped to 
achieve and all saw the reform of the OAU as the main road to accomplishing these goals. Hence, 
despite disagreeing with the Libyan leader’s plan for an ‘United States of Africa’, both Mbeki and 
65 
 
Obasanjo allowed Gaddafi to host the extraordinary meeting of OAU leaders in Sirte, Libya to avoid 
the high costs of hosting a summit, whilst also pushing forward OAU reform. At the same time, 
Obasanjo fully supported Mbeki’s proposals in return for support for his own suggestions of reform 
(Tieku, 2004: 255, 260). As the OAU required two-thirds majority to pass a resolution (OAU, 1963: 
article X (2)), the other 53 member states would also need to be persuaded to reform an 
organisation which, while not benefiting leaders extraordinarily, did not cost them much in regards 
to financial or political capital. 
The end result of the negotiations, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, can be seen as a 
document of the lowest common denominator. While South Africa and Nigeria may have 
accomplished some of their goals, other states were able to water it down so that it became “simply 
an organisational framework for the future political integration of the African continent” (Maluwa, 
2004: 196). While the document is a vast improvement over that of the OAU, it was still a long way 
off being a step towards providing Africa with the organisation needed to bring integration closer. 
While Gaddafi’s ideas of approving a single currency and African standing army at that time were 
extreme, they are a step in the right direction for African unity. However, in the end no mention of 
these ideas was included (Tieku, 2004: 262). In addition, like the OAU, the Assembly of Heads of 
State is still the supreme organ of the Union and institutions that were to be set up by the 
Constitutive Act that may have been able to check that power, such as the PAP, the Court of Justice 
and the Financial Institutions, have yet to become active, as proven above. They receive little 
wording in the original act, except for stating they will be dealt with in a later protocol. These 
protocols, when amended to the Constitutive Act, went through the same intergovernmental 
process and were also the lowest common denominator decision, with vague references and 
timelines, and no real danger to state sovereignty. Maluwa sees these amendments as another 
example of African states compromising to come to an agreement, one that is neither a victory nor a 
defeat (Maluwa, 2004: 203). Some of these dealt with issues such as human rights and collective 
security and leaders were unwilling to confront or take on these questions (Maluwa, 2004: 200). 
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Similarly, Baimu and Sturman argue that article 4(h), which gives the Union the right to “intervene in 
a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU, 2000: 4(h)), is actually “not intended to 
protect the individual rights but to entrench the regimes in power” (Baimu and Sturman, 2003: 43). 
What this means is that the AU, in which the Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the 
supreme organ, can argue against external regime changes and can use the article 4(p), which 
condemns unconstitutional changes in government, to protect regimes that may experience 
nationalist uprisings.  
One can see that in this liberal intergovernmental decision making framework, the decisions made 
will never be victories or defeats. They will always be the lowest common denominator decision, as 
states that want to see a goal accomplished, in this case South Africa and Nigeria, be willing to make 
concessions to other states with less involvement, such as watering down language that may be 
detrimental to a ruling leader’s power.  
If decision making of this sort continues in Africa, integration can only proceed so far, as there will be 
no grand decisions agreed upon that would, for example, bind all states in a customs union, 
harmonize transport policies or allow for the free movement of people, goods and capital – all 
factors that would increase integration and development on the continent. 
4.3 Integration with Supranationalism: The ECSC 
The alternative to the above model is one where there is a supranational authority which is also 
involved in the decision making process. The ECSC, despite much opposition, had an element of 
supranationalism through its High Authority and has evolved into the EU, the single best example of 
regional integration to date. Despite political leaders’ reluctance, the EU continues to pursue deeper 
vertical integration . Why is this? This thesis argues that because of the original supranational push, 
the ECSC placed Europe into a supranational "black hole", as they could then not get out of it. 
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Despite attempts by leaders to try to win some power back, such as during the Eurosclerosis of the 
1970s, integration has continued. 
Despite their hesitation, European leaders did establish a supranational authority with the ECSC and 
continued this with their move to the EEC and EURATOM, with the supranational authority gaining 
more and more power throughout the decades, from the Single European Act of 1986 up to the 
1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which gives much more power to the European Parliament and the 
European Commission, two supranational institutions. While realists and those in favour of 
intergovernmentalism argue that this is a rational choice on the part of the states, this thesis argues 
that neofunctional theory can best explain this continued integration and that for integration to 
proceed effectively, supranational institutions must be created. 
Haas’ explanation of neofunctionalism, which was explained above in chapter one in greater detail, 
can be summarised thusly:  elites will recognize a problem which cannot be solved at a national level 
and, as they find other elites in other states with the same problem, they push their governments to 
transfer the competence over that sector to a supranational institution. If the problem is big enough 
and the elites are strong enough, a supranational institution will be established. Once established, 
other groups recognise the benefits of supranational governance and begin to attempt to influence 
the supranational institution instead of the nation-state, allowing the institution to acquire 
expertise, information and legitimacy. Both the supranational actor and domestic elites will continue 
to pressure the national governments into transferring more powers away from the nation-state, 
resulting in spillover into other sectors.  
This is the basic starting point of European integration, as explained above. After WWII, European 
states were fearful of a return to war so attempted to harmonize policies on steel and coal, 
materials which were vital during WWII. The member states, though hesitant, agreed and set up a 
supranational institution. Other elite groups recognized the advantage of this scenario and pushed 
for further integration, eventually leading to the EEC and EURATOM, a clear spillover into other 
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sectors. While speculative, it would be hard to imagine the European leaders agreeing to these extra 
institutions if the decisions made were purely intergovernmental and there was no pressure from 
the supranational institution and those elites below the nation-state who recognized its benefit. 
These institutions are sustained because, despite member states’ interest in maximising their own 
autonomy and controlling their resources, the supranational institutions create rules which are to 
the benefit of the growing transnational society (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 305). As the 
supranational institution grows, so do the opportunities for transnational actors to play the national 
level off the supranational level and increase the supranational institutions legitimacy and 
knowledge once again. In other words, governments “may resist the shift toward supranational 
policy-making. . . but as they do so, they inhibit the generation of wealth within their territories by 
those actors who depend on European transactions” (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 306). This means 
that governments are reactive to integration – they act when there is pressure to do so, but they do 
not solely drive the integration process. Once there is a supranational institution, governments are 
unable to reclaim their powers very easily and are, thus, stuck in the ‘blackhole’ of supranationalism. 
This ‘blackhole’ continues since spillover into other sectors will happen as elites see the advantages 
of supranational governance, as Haas suggested, but also because as one hindrance is removed 
because of supranational rules then other obstacles are found, which then also need to be removed, 
which continues the spillover pattern (Sandholtz and Sweet, n.d.). 
In Africa, this process has not taken place because of the lack of supranational institutions. As 
explained above, the majority of African resolutions and treaties of integration still place supreme 
power in the hands of the Heads of State. This is opposite to what happened in the Treaty of Paris in 
1951, which established the ECSC, and the Treaty of Rome in 1956, which established the EEC. While 
there were, of course, contentions about the amount of power that the supranational organisation 
had, especially during the EEC negotiations, European states continued their integration with 
supranational institutions that were able to be decision makers from the start because “once a basic 
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commitment has been undertaken, even a government frightened by the possible consequences of 
supranationalism can be induced to go along with its partners” (Haas, 1958: 271). In other words, 
once leaders gave power to a supranational institution (the ECSC), it was difficult to take these 
powers back. While European leaders succeeded in decreasing some of the supranational powers of 
the EEC, they were not able to eliminate them, nor were the supranational powers abolished during 
De Gaulle’s ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ of the 1960s, the Eurosclerosis of the 1970s and Thatcherism in the 
1980s. The supranational institution of the European Commission and the European Parliament 
remained and, while slowed, continued the process of a transfer of power from the nation-state 
(Awesti, 2006).  
As stated earlier, the EAC has been the only REC to set up supranational organisations that are able 
to challenge the power of the nation state. The question now becomes: will the EAC follow the ECSC 
and the EEC and become more and more integrated? The answer to this is yes – now that there is a 
supranational organisation in this regional economic community and transnational exchange 
increases, spillover will occur throughout the sectors and there will be greater and greater 
integration. There may be attempts by leaders to push it back towards intergovernmental 
bargaining, which will result in a slowing of integration such as in the Eurosclerosis of the 1970s, but 
integration will continue. Indeed, the difficulty lies in developing a timeline for this integration. State 
leaders are already attempting to push back dates for the common market and monetary union and 
neo-patrimonial politics will continue to impede integration progress. This is because neo-
patrimonialism undercuts capitalism and civil society (Bratton, 1994: 462 and 467), which is needed 
for neofunctionalism, and integration in general (Mattli, 1999: 49-50), to work well. It is the pressure 
put on leaders by civil society and national capitalist elites which will drive integration further, but 
this pressure will be minimal in a neopatrimonial society. As Nye stated in 1966, it was the united 
national industrial pressure groups in Europe which pressured Brussels to integrate, while in Africa 
“the interaction of bureaucracy and pressure groups did not provide an engine for interaction, partly 
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because the bureaucracy had few executive powers, and partly because open pressure politics were 
of questionable legitimacy” (Nye, 1966: 23). 
With the supranational strides taken by one of the RECs, will this then spillover into other parts of 
Africa? The answer to this is no, unless other leaders are also willing to set up true supranational 
institutions and push integration further. Haas, in The Uniting of Europe, believed that for 
neofunctionalism to work and for political communities to be formed, there needed to be "(1) an 
industrialized economy deeply enmeshed in international trade and finance, (2) societies in which 
the masses are fully mobilized politically and tend to channel their aspirations through permanent 
interest groups and political parties, (3) societies in which these groups are habitually led by 
identifiable elites competing with one another for influence and in disagreement on many basic 
values, and (4) societies in which relations among these elites are governed by the traditions and 
assumptions of parliamentary (or presidential) democracy and constitutionalism" (Haas, 1958: xvi). 
While one could debate the whole of Haas' statement, this thesis does not have the room for such a 
discussion and will concentrate on the second statement. The lack of a functioning civil society and 
mobilized political masses is a direct occurrence from the neopatrimonial regime of many African 
societies. Even in the EAC, which is the most advanced REC in the AU, there is still not sufficient 
pressure from domestic elites and pressure groups to lobby the supranational institutions, which 
then does not give that supranational institution enough knowledge and legitimacy needed for it to 
push national governments for further powers and increased integration.  
This could result in a two speed integration process in Africa, as the EAC continues integrating into 
other sectors (though slower than the EU project because of the neopatrimonial societies) while the 
other RECs continue to push back dates for integration and implement lowest common denominator 
decisions which lead to little improvement of the situation on the continent. Further integration is a 
positive for the continent, but halfway measures that are implemented by leaders for fear of a loss 
of power and resources will not provide the benefits of effective integration. Power must be 
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transferred to a supranational institution to force the integration process ahead into a ‘blackhole’ 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis may, at times, seem as though it has been written by an Afro-pessimist, but this could not 
be further from the truth. Africa’s rich resources and young population provide what is needed for it 
to be a highly successful continent and regional integration will only help it along this path. 
Integration can help the continent along this path towards sustained economic growth, improved 
governance and increased bargaining power in a globalised world. The fact that this integration has 
not happened has been blamed on myriad factors, but the aim of this thesis is to show that 
integration has been ineffective in Africa because of the neopatrimonial political system, which 
makes leaders hesitant to cede any power to another institution as doing so could result in a loss of 
resources and, eventually, political power for that leader. The refusal to cede power means that 
integration cannot proceed as originally planned, as decisions and bargains about integration will be 
intergovernmental and result in the lowest common denominator decision. Some power will need to 
be ceded to a supranational organisation so that spillover mechanisms above and below the state 
can push the integration process to where it needs to be. 
The first research aim of this thesis was to analyse the reasons for the slow progress of African 
integration. By first looking at the history of African integration, this thesis has shown that there 
have been many past attempts where leaders, espousing rhetoric of unity and integration, have 
failed to follow through on their promises and the organisations became defunct or never 
successfully started. Even the more recent attempts, through the African Union and the Regional 
Economic Communities, have been shown to be inefficient as they have been unable to fulfil the 
goals and objectives set in the founding treaties.  
The reason for this inefficiency rests on the shoulders of the leaders, who despite signing and 
championing these treaties of integration, refuse to actually concede what is necessary for these 
treaties to be effective. They refuse to do so, because doing so would mean a loss of resources and 
power in the neopatrimonial political environment. The prevalence of neopatrimonial regimes in 
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Africa, which survive through a system of patronage and clientelism requiring a large amount of 
liquid resources at the leader’s disposal, mean that organisations that are set up to implement 
integration will inevitably be run intergovernmentally, as leaders are fearful of ceding any power to 
another organisation which they cannot control. However, the main problem with this attitude of 
leaders is that it means that integration will proceed at a slow pace and cannot proceed as far as the 
stated goals in the many treaties signed by these leaders – a goal of economic and political unity.  
The second research aim was to prove that integration cannot proceed very far in a purely 
intergovernmental fashion. Some sovereignty will have to be shared with a supranational institution 
for integration to be effective. A solution to the problem of integration, though one which leaders 
are loathe to pursue, would be to establish an institution with supranational powers, which would 
be another actor in the integration discussions. The European Union followed this path, while the 
Organisation of African Unity and the African Union have not. Despite many similarities in their initial 
establishment, this major difference between the two organisations has been responsible for their 
different outcomes. African integration organisations have remained intergovernmental, which 
means that national governments and Heads of State are the supreme actors in the discussions. As 
such, decisions will be based on consensus, if not unanimity. This means that all member states 
effectively have a veto, and those who are pushing for integration and who do not want to ‘leave the 
table’ will have to compromise all other view points before a final decision is made. This results in a 
lowest common denominator decision being passed. If some power was to be ceded to a 
supranational organisation, this would result in functional spillover and better empower actors 
above and below the nation state. This would better enable these two actors to push for more 
integration, as loyalties would shift and knowledge would be gained. As restrictions in one area are 
removed, other obstacles are found which also need to be dealt with at a supranational level, 
resulting in a ‘blackhole’ of supranationality which leaders will find difficult to stop. 
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This thesis has shown how integration in Africa has not progressed nor succeeded as envisioned in 
the many treaties and resolutions for integration. The reason for this is a lack of political will by 
leaders, for fear of a loss of national power. This thesis has also demonstrated that integration 
cannot be effective if run in a purely intergovernmental manner, as it is in Africa. Some power will 
need to be ceded to a supranational institution so that there is another actor involved in the 
decisions and for functionalism to work, there will also have to be a solid civil society that can lobby 





Appendix I – History of African Integration Attempts 
Year Name of integration attempt Details on integration attempt 
1910 Southern African Customs 
Union 
29 June. Customs union between Union of South Africa 
(South Africa) and High Commission Territories of 
Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and 
Swaziland. Relaunched in 1969 after independence. Namibia 
joined in 1990 and relaunched again in 2002 after apartheid.  
Allied with the Common Monetary Area, which creates a 
monetary union, on par with the rand. Replaced with 
Multilateral Monetary Area in February 1992, when Namibia 
joined the monetary union. Botswana is only member not 
involved. 
1958 Pan-African Freedom 
Movement for East and 
Central Africa (PAFMECA) 
16-18 September in Mwanza, Tanganyika. Led by Kenyatta, 
Nyere and Obote. Goal was to have a political federation 
after independence. Brought in countries from Southern 
Africa in 1962 and renamed PAFMECSA. Abolished with 
opening of Organisation of African Unity. 
1958 Union of Independent African 
States 
23 November and officially recognized during 1st All African 
Peoples’ Organisation Conference in December 1958. Union 
between Ghana and Guinea and later Mali in 1960, when it 
was renamed Union of African States. Abolished in 1962 as 
Guinea created ties with the United States, which was 
counter to the Marxist leanings of the other states 
1959 Equatorial Customs Union Between Gabon, Chad, Congo and CAR. Cameroon joined in 
1961. Lead to the UDEAC. 
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1959 Union Douanière de l’Afrique 
de l’Ouest 
Superseded in 1972 by the West African Economic 
Community. 
1960 Mali Federation 4 April. Federation of Senegal and French Sudan. Broke up 
on 20 August, 1960. 
1960 Union des Républiques de 
l’Afrique Central (URAC) 
Plan for an economic and political union between Congo, 
Gabon, Chad and Central African Republic. Gabon declined 
to ratify charter and then other states obtained 
representation at the UN, abolishing the union.  
1961 Union Africaine et Malgache 
(UAM) 
12 September. Changed name to Union Africaine et 
Malgache de Cooperation Économique (UAMCE) in 1964, 
which confined it to just economic affairs. Members were 
Chad, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Dahomey (Benin), 
Gabon, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Mauritania, Niger, 
Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), CAR, Senegal, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Togo, Zaire (DRC), Rwanda, Mauritius. Many 
withdrew in 1974. Abolished in 1985. 
1961 East African Common Services 
Organisation 
9 December. With Tanganyika’s independence, organisation 
established with Kenya and later Uganda. Superseded by 
East African Community in 1967. 
1963 East Africa Federation June 5. Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda announce intentions 
to form federation by end of year, and later through the 
EAC, which was abolished in 1977. 
1963 Organisation of African Unity 22-26 May, met in Addis to discuss African Unity. Timing 
auspicious as was after Algeria became independent, as 
Casablanca group did not attend other meetings as Algeria 
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was not allowed to join. Superseded by African Union. 
1964 United Republic of Tanzania 26 April. Tanganyika and Zanzibar unite after Sultan of 
Zanzibar overthrown, but Zanzibar remains semi-
autonomous. 
1964 Customs and Economic Union 
of Central Africa/Union 
Douanière et Économique de 
l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) 
Became Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
1964 Maghreb Permanent 
Consultative Committee 
1 October. Members are Algeria, Libya, Morocco and 
Tunisia. Makes proposals for further coordination and 
integration in region. Superseded by UMA. 
1967 East African Community 6 June. Between independent Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanganyika. Based off of years of colonial cooperation 
between states. Collapsed in 1977. 
1972 United Arab Republic 1 January. Created by approved referendums in Libya, Egypt 
and Syria in September 1971. No consensus on terms of the 
merger. Dissolved in 19 November 1977. Was also several 
other federations involving Egypt, Libya, Syria and Sudan 
during this time. 
1972 West African Economic 
Community 
Became the West African Monetary Union. 
1973 Mano River Union Association between Sierra Leone and Liberia to foster 
economic cooperation. Guinea joined in 1980 and Cote 
d’Ivoire in 2008. 
1975 Economic Community of West Treaty revised in 1993 to accelerate integration and 
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African States establish economic and monetary union. Mauritania 
withdrew in 1999, so now 15 members: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone 
and Togo. 
1976 Communauté Économique 
des Pays des Grand Lacs 
20 September in Gisenyi, Rwanda. Agreement by Burundi, 
Zaire (DRC) and Rwanda to promote regional cooperation 
and integration. 
1981 Preferential Trade Area Became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa 
1982 Senegambia confederation 1 February. Senegal and Gambia form a confederation. 
Dissolved in 1989. 
1983 Communauté Économique 
des États de l’Afrique Centrale 
(CEEAC) 
October. Proposed common market between Angola, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, DR 
Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe 
and Chad. Organisation was defunct because of financial 
difficulties between 1992 and 1998, but is now continued. 
1984 Indian Ocean Commission Intergovernmental organisation between Comoros, Reunion 
Island, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. Deals mainly 
with environmental issues 
1988 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) Member states are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia. Aims for economic and political unity. Inactive on 
account of political and economic disagreements. 
1992 Southern African 
Development Community 
August. Previously known as the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Members 
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are Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Main strategy is pushing 
cooperation and integration in a range of sectors and 
markets.  
1994 West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (UEMOA) 
January. Based on West Africa Monetary Union of the CFA 
franc zone. Currency is guaranteed at fixed parity to the 
Euro (656 to 1) through an arrangement with the French 
treasury. Members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Guinea-Bissau, which joined 
in 1997. Integration and development promoted by the 
Banque Ouest Africaine de Developpement, established in 
1973. 
1994 Communauté Économique et 
Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale 
(CEMAC) 
Previously the UDEAC. Customs and monetary union 
between Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.  
1994 Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) 
Previously the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Members are Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DR 
Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya (since 
June 2005), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Some members have withdrawn, including 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Namibia. Wants to set 
up full FTA and customs union. 
1996 Intergovernmental Authority Superseded the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought 
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on Development (IGAD) and Development (IGADD). Members are Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. 
1998 Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CEN-SAD) 
February. Goal is economic unity through a FTA. Member 
states are Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Niger, Sudan, 
Central African Republic, Eritrea, Djibouti, Gambia, Senegal, 
Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Benin, Togo, Ivory 
Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Comoros, 
Guinea, Kenya, Sao Tome and Principe. Mauritania left the 
community in 2012.  
1999 Nile Basin Initiative Includes Burundi, DR Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Established to 
pursue cooperative development and promote regional 
integration. 
2000 East African Community (EAC) Re-established ties towards regional integration between 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Main objective is deeper 
economic integration. 
2002 African Union Includes all African states, except for Morocco. The main 






Appendix II: Select Objectives of the AU and the RECs 
Organisation Major Objectives 
Southern African 
Customs Union 
-to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods between the territories of 
the Member States;  
-to create effective, transparent and democratic institutions which will ensure 
equitable trade benefits to Member States;  
-to facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue arising from customs, excise and 
additional duties levied by Member States; and  
-to facilitate the development of common policies and strategies (SACU, 2002). 





-to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an 
economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its 
peoples; and  
-to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member 
States and contribute to the progress and development of the African 
Continent (ECOWAS, 1993). 
Communauté 
Économique des 
Pays des Grand 
Lacs 
-to ensure the security of the member states and their populations; and 
-to promote trade and free movement of people and goods (CEPGL, 1975). 
Communauté 
Économique des 
États de l’Afrique 
Centrale 
-to promote and strengthen harmonious cooperation and balanced 
development in social and economic areas (CEEAC, 1983). 






-to adopt common policy in all areas; and 
-to realize the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital between 




-to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the 
standard and quality of life and support the social disadvantaged through 
regional integration; and 




-to strengthen the competitiveness of financial and economic activities as part 
of a rationalized and harmonized legal environment; and 
-to create a common market based on free movement of persons, goods, 





-to promote peace and development within the framework of an economic and 
monetary union (CEMAC, 2008). 
Common Market 
for Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
-to attain sustainable growth and development of the Member States by 
promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of its production and 
marketing  
structures; and  
-to promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint 
adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to  raise the standard of 
living of its peoples and to foster closer relations among its Member States 
(COMESA, 1993). 






policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields; and 
-to harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, 
communications, 
agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, 
services,  





-to establish a global economic union based on strategy through a development 
plan complementary to national development plans; and 
-to remove all restrictions hampering integration of these countries through 
adoption of free movement of persons, capital and interests of national of 
Member States, right of establishment, ownership and exercise of economic 
activity, free trade, movement of goods, commodities and services originating 
from the signatory countries (CEN-SAD, 1998). 
Nile Basin Initiative -to develop the Nile Basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way 
to ensure prosperity, security, and peace for all its peoples and efficient water 
management and the optimal use of the resources 
East African 
Community 
-to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening 
cooperation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural 
fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs 
(EAC, 1999). 
African Union -to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the 
peoples of Africa; 




-to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; 
-to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the 
continent and its peoples; 
-to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; and 
-to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and 
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